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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on how corporations and banks incentivize
their CEOs and bankers to make optimal decisions under different settings. The first
two essays are empirical with a focus on CEOs and corporate governance of firms
that are targeted by activist hedge funds. The third essay builds a principal–agent
model for a bank and its bankers in an asymmetric information setting.
The first essay is co–authored with Jana Fidrmuc. We document the effect
of hedge fund activism on the corporate governance of target firms via the specific
channel of CEO compensation. We find that target CEOs receive higher stock and
total compensation, as compared to their peers, prior to an activist’s entry. The
entry of hedge fund activists results in a decline in target CEO pay to levels prevalent
at matched firms. This decrease is not because target CEOs were extracting rents
before activism. We show that the entry of hedge fund activists also results in a
decline in the pay–for–performance sensitivity of CEO stock awards and total pay
at target firms. These findings indicate that incentive compensation and monitoring
by activist hedge funds act as substitutes in motivating CEOs to improve firm value.
In the second essay, I analyze the role of a firm’s internal CEO–specific cor-
porate governance mechanisms in influencing the decision of activist hedge funds
to target that company. I find that activist hedge funds prefer to select firms that
have good CEO governance mechanisms in place, prior to being targeted. My re-
sults show that prior to activists’ entry, target firm CEOs receive more equity–based
incentives rather than cash–based pay. Target firms do not have near–retirement
CEOs who are more difficult to discipline. Activism target firms have fairly inde-
pendent boards, which is at a level similar to peer firms. CEO pay at target firms
before activism is also sensitive to firm performance.
The third essay investigates the remuneration required by bankers to truth-
fully reveal the risk profile of their asset classes, under information asymmetry, when
bankers are more informed than a bank. In an adverse selection canonical model
with two discrete banker types, High risk and Low risk, I find that the bank can
achieve a positive separation of banker types without leaving any information rent
for the banker. When moral hazard is present, and the banker has a choice to exert
effort to shift the distribution of returns, the bank leaves an information rent for




This thesis explores agency relationships in which a principal, such as a corporate
firm or a bank, delegates some responsibility and authority to make decisions on
behalf of the principal to an agent, such as a CEO or a banker. A self–utility
maximizing agent might not always act in the best interests of the principal, but
the principal can design incentives and monitor the agent to ensure alignment of
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The thesis consists of three chapters which
analyze the incentives that principals establish for their agents in different scenarios.
Chapters 2 and 3 are empirical studies of CEOs of firms targeted by activist
hedge funds. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of hedge fund activism on the
compensation package of target firm CEOs, and finds that the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of CEO compensation decreases post–activism. This result suggests that
executive compensation and monitoring by activist hedge funds act as substitute
mechanisms in encouraging target firm management to improve firm value. Chapter
3 analyzes CEO characteristics and other corporate governance aspects of firms prior
to when they are targeted by activist hedge funds. The key finding is that activist
hedge funds target firms which award their CEOs more equity. Chapter 3 implies
that hedge funds are more likely to target firms in which CEOs have incentives to
improve firm performance, hence, will work together with the activists to serve their
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agenda of unlocking dormant firm value. However, once the activist enters a target
firm and starts monitoring management, costly incentive compensation is no longer
necessary to motivate management to improve firm value, as implied by Chapter 2.
Chapters 2 and 3, thus, jointly map the pre–activism characteristics of CEO pay to
its post–activism evolution.
Chapter 4 digresses from hedge fund activism and focuses instead on bankers’
incentives in a scenario where a bank has less information than a banker about asset
class risk. The results from this chapter establish that awarding performance–related
bonuses can help banks get a truthful revelation of asset class risk from the banker.
Though this chapter centers on risk management within a bank, it still maintains
a crucial link to the previous two chapters via its focus on banker remuneration.
Furthermore, the model in Chapter 4 can be extended beyond a banking framework
and can be applied to a setting within a corporation as well. The common thread
that ties all the three chapters together is the analysis of incentives that motivate
agents to act in the interest of their principals.
The three chapters are organized in the form of papers. Chapter 2 is co–
authored with Jana Fidrmuc, and I am the sole author of Chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 2
Hedge fund activists receive wide–spread attention in the business press for
their public criticism of target firm governance and costly proxy fights (Vardi, 2014).
Hedge fund managers acquire large stake positions in a handful of publicly listed
companies, and campaign more freely for changes in various aspects of the tar-
get firms’ governance, as compared to other traditional institutional shareholders
like mutual and pension funds (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Hedge funds are exempt
from regulatory barriers that restrict investment concentration, and have high pay–
for–performance incentives for their managers, which enables their activism. The
literature shows that activist hedge funds improve payout, operating performance
and corporate governance of their target firms, with an aim to increase the value
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of their own portfolio and earn significant return (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur,
2009). In order to implement these changes, hedge fund activists align the interests
of target firm management with their own value–maximizing objective. However,
the impact of activism on managerial incentives to improve target firm value is
currently under–explored.
In this paper, we fill the gap in the literature and provide evidence on how
hedge fund activism influences the compensation package of target CEOs. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that hedge fund managers, with an overall goal of significant
target performance improvement, tend to oppose excessive managerial pay, and
often advocate the use of pay packages that are performance sensitive (Goldstein,
2015; Smith, 1996). Univariate findings of Brav et al. (2008) also indicate that hedge
funds curtail executive compensation and improve pay–for–performance sensitivity.
Therefore, our prior is that hedge fund activism reduces the overall target CEO
pay, increases performance oriented equity incentives, and enhances the sensitivity
of compensation to firm performance.
We find that target firms pay their CEOs $353 thousand more than their
matched counterparts, in the year of activists’ entry. One year after activism, this
difference disappears. This evidence is consistent with our prior that activist hedge
funds reduce excess overall CEO pay. In the year of activism, target firm CEOs
receive $321 thousand more than their peers in terms of stock incentives such as re-
stricted stock and restricted stock units, and this difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level. One year after activists’ entry, stock incentives awarded to target
CEOs are not different from their matched equivalents. This result for stock com-
pensation contradicts our prior that activists push for higher performance–related
pay at target firms.
We have two possible explanations for this surprising result. First, stock
awards are not truly fulfilling their role as incentive compensation, but are rather
used to over–compensate CEOs. The second alternative reasoning is that stock
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compensation is based on firm performance, and in the absence of activism, stock
awards provide a significant incentive to CEOs to improve firm value. Activism
targets do not have any deficiencies in this respect. However, compensation which
is related to firm performance is expensive, because it exposes risk–averse managers
to too much volatility in their pay, who would in turn want to be compensated for
the risk and ask for more pay (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013). Once
activists enter a target firm, they decrease stock compensation because they monitor
target firm management anyway, so they do not need to motivate managers through
costly incentive compensation.
To reconcile the stock pay puzzle, we further investigate if performance-
oriented pay such as stock awards are in reality sensitive to firm performance. Our
results show that the sensitivity of CEO stock and total compensation to past firm
performance is significantly higher for target firms, relative to their peers before
activism, but becomes insignificant one year after activism. Thus, we show that
stock awards are indeed commensurate to target firm performance before activism,
and are not used to over–compensate the CEO. We conjecture that the decrease in
pay–for–performance sensitivity reflects monitoring by activist hedge funds, which
substitutes for incentive–laden compensation (Hartzell, 1998; Fahlenbrach, 2009;
Mehran, 1995).
Chapter 3
The literature suggests that hedge fund activism generates value because ac-
tivists can credibly commit on behalf of shareholders, to intervene and discipline
management to make firm–value maximizing decisions (Brav et al., 2008). This ar-
gument is consistent with a managerial agency view, in which target firm managers
take hidden actions in their own interests and at the expense of shareholders, before
an activist’s entry (Cremers et al., 2017). This view implies that activism targets
are firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanisms, prior to activism.
For example, firms with powerful CEOs who also chair the board thereby reducing
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its independence, and firms with entrenched managers who extract rents in the form
of excessive and performance–insensitive compensation. Thus, the agency paradigm
considers hedge fund activists to be champions of dispersed shareholders, who mon-
itor and persuade the managers of poorly governed firms to make shareholder value
their priority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
The literature, however, does not provide an explicit analysis of these CEO–
specific corporate governance features of hedge fund activism targets, before the
onset of activism. In this paper, I use hand–collected data on firms’ CEO–centered
governance variables, and other firm–specific governance and accounting character-
istics to shed light on the entrenchment or bad CEO characteristics hypothesis – do
hedge fund activists really target firms with weaker CEO–realted corporate gover-
nance? In contrast to the claim made in the literature, I find that activists prefer
to target firms with good CEOs, i.e. firms where CEOs are not entrenched and
already have incentives to increase firm value, hence, will work together with ac-
tivists towards a common goal of value improvement – a good CEO characteristics
hypothesis.
I estimate the marginal effect of different CEO–related governance covariates
a year prior to activism, on the likelihood of a firm being targeted a year later. These
governance variables include dummies that capture if the CEO is close to retirement
and if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO duality), dollar values of
individual components of CEO compensation – salary, bonus, stock, options and
other miscellaneous pay, and CEO stock ownership. CEOs near the end of their
careers do not have reputational concerns and might not fear disciplinary sanctions
(Hu and Kumar, 2004). When the CEO is also the chairman of the board, it
reduces board independence, makes internal governance less effective and promotes
managerial entrenchment (Jensen, 1993). Higher cash–based CEO compensation,
such as salary and bonuses that are not tied to firm performance, indicates bad
governance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). On the other hand, stock ownership in the
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firm can provide high powered incentives to CEOs to improve firm value.
My results show that a one–standard deviation increase in the dollar value of
CEO stock awards, from its sample average, is associated with a 7 percentage point
increase in the probability of a firm being targeted the next year, ceteris paribus.
Cash based bonuses, on the other hand, are negatively related to the targeting like-
lihood. Thus, target firm CEOs receive more equity–based incentives rather than
cash–based pay. However, I find that activism target CEOs have low equity owner-
ship, which justifies the use of more stock awards in target firms, since equity com-
pensation can succeed in increasing incentives of lower ownership managers (Ofek
and Yermack, 2000). I find that the CEO retirement and CEO duality dummies
do not have any significant impact on the probability of a firm being targeted by
activist hedge funds. Target and non–target firms do not differ significantly in terms
of the retirement and duality variables, before an activist’s entry. Approximately
11% of target firm CEOs and 13% of control firm CEOs are near–retirement. 43%
of target CEOs and 47% of matched firm CEOs hold the chairman position as well.
The findings above reflect good CEO characteristics at target firms. Target
firms do not have many CEOs who are difficult to discipline because they are nearing
the end of their careers. Board independence at target firms, as measured by CEO
duality, is at a level similar to peer firms. I also use the proportion of outside
directors on the board as a measure of board independence, and find that both
target and matched firms have fairly independent boards. Around 82% of their
boards is comprised of outside directors. Target CEOs have a low level of stock
accrued from previous years, but, target firms award their CEOs’ with more equity,
as compared to peer firms, which creates incentives for CEOs to enhance firm value,
since they get a share of the value improvement.
Chapter 4
This paper considers a well diversified bank at its optimal level of overall risk,
and explores an incentive system that enables the bank to screen and extract infor-
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mation about the risk associated with individual asset classes. In a principal–agent
model, in which bankers possess better information about the asset class risk and
the bank wants access to that information, I find that the bank designs remunera-
tion tailored to the risk reported by bankers. Bankers can be paid entirely in fixed
wages or in performance–related bonuses, depending on the risk of their trades, such
that the bank can get truthful revelation of project risk. This formulation captures
traditional investment banks and their asset managers, who engage in risky trades
like currencies, commodities and complex derivatives (Skypala, 2011).
My paper focuses on the role of incentives in encouraging risk–revealing be-
haviour of bankers. The bank always stays within a predetermined overall optimal
risk limit, and the bank tries to monitor the risk of individual projects, such that
they always aggregate up to the optimal level. I do not analyze a situation where
the bank aims to get individual bankers to take less risk, as I assume all risk to be
managed optimally at the overall bank level. The bank makes the risk taking deci-
sion, in essence, in its allocation of resources across the balance sheet. Rather, the
bank’s objective is to maximize profits, subject to getting the banker to truthfully
reveal risk when he is better informed than the bank. Thus, my analysis establishes
banker remuneration as a tool to not just reward bankers, but also as a screening
device for project risk. The bank subsequently uses information on risk to allocate
resources for investment to the banker.
The model analyzes a scenario in which a profit–maximizing, risk neutral
bank– the principal– delegates the task of managing risky value enhancing projects
to a risk neutral banker– the agent– who is required to report the risk of his asset
class to the bank. I measure risk as the variance of the random returns the asset
class generates. On the basis of this risk report, the bank provides the banker some
compensation for his services. These compensation contracts ex–ante satisfy con-
straints on banker participation and ensure that the banker is truthful about project
risk. The paper starts with an illustrative model of two project types, High risk and
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Low risk, with discrete returns, and then moves on to a more realistic framework
with continuous project returns. I extend the model to include costly effort on part
of the bankers to increase returns, which leads to remuneration contracts getting
further constrained by the additional task of motivating bankers to exert effort.
Results from the paper show that the first–best, complete information com-
pensation contract offers each type of banker a remuneration, which in expected
value pays just as much as the outside option of the banker. This compensation
contract can take any form, for example, either a fixed wage or performance varying
pay, amongst many others. Under asymmetric information and the adverse selection
problem, the bank can still achieve a positive separation of types without leaving
any information rent for the banker, as in the first–best case. But, the fully general
remuneration scheme breaks down and in order to prevent bunching of types, the
bank has to offer the Low type a fixed wage, and the High type a performance
varying bonus. When moral hazard interacts with adverse selection, the bank can
no longer separate banker types by simply paying both types an amount equal to
their outside option. Bonuses need to be paid to both types of bankers, with the
High type getting an information rent to achieve a separating equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
Hedge Fund Activism and CEO
Compensation
2.1 Introduction
Hedge fund activists receive wide-spread attention in the business press for their
public criticism of target firm governance and costly proxy fights (Vardi, 2014).
Hedge fund managers acquire large stake positions in a handful of publicly listed
companies, and campaign more freely for changes in various aspects of the tar-
get firms’ governance, as compared to other traditional institutional shareholders
like mutual and pension funds (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Hedge funds are exempt
from regulatory barriers that restrict investment concentration, and have high pay-
for-performance incentives for their managers, which enables their activism.1 The
literature shows that activist hedge funds improve payout, operating performance
and corporate governance of their target firms, with an aim to increase the value
of their own portfolio and earn significant return (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur,
2009).2 In order to implement these changes, hedge fund activists align the interests
1See Appendix 2.5.1 for the institutional and regulatory background of hedge funds.
2Target firms, henceforth, will be used as a shorthand for firms that are targets of hedge fund
activism.
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of target firm management with their own value-maximizing objective. However, the
impact of activism on managerial incentives to improve target firm value is currently
under-explored.
In this paper, we fill the gap in the literature and provide evidence on how
hedge fund activism influences the compensation package of target CEOs. Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that hedge fund managers, with an overall goal of significant
target performance improvement, tend to oppose excessive managerial pay, and of-
ten advocate the use of pay packages that are performance sensitive (Goldstein,
2015; Smith, 1996). Univariate findings of Brav et al. (2008) also indicate that
hedge funds curtail executive compensation and improve pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity. Therefore, our prior is that hedge fund activism reduces the fixed base salary
and overall target CEO pay, increases performance oriented equity incentives, and
enhances the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance.
To test this hypothesis, we hand-collect data on CEO compensation for 244
U.S. publicly listed firms that were targeted by hedge fund activists from 2009 to
2011 and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book-to-market matched firms,
which serve as a control group. We gather the compensation data for 7 years – the
year of activism, 3 years before and 3 years after activism – from proxy statements
made publicly available on the EDGAR webpage of the US SEC. We are not able
to gather compensation data for a representative sample from Compustat’s Execu-
Comp, which is the typical source for compensation data in the literature, because
hedge fund targets are usually small firms.3 ExecuComp contains compensation
data only on fairly large S&P 1500 companies, and relying solely on ExecuComp
would impose a significant size bias. We start our compensation data collection from
2006 because option expensing was made mandatory by the FAS 123R regulation in
2006 (FASB, 2004a,b).4 This accounting treatment creates inconsistencies in data
3Hedge funds have to forgo a substantial amount of capital to acquire a meaningful stake in a
large firm, and usually target smaller firms (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Greenwood and
Schor, 2009).
4See Appendix 2.5.2 for an explanation of the FAS 123R regulation.
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collection, and also led to a decline in popularity for option awards (Frydman and
Jenter, 2010; Damodaran, 2005). Moreover, we are able to exploit the enhanced dis-
closure requirements introduced by SEC amendments in 2006, which were aimed at
increasing transparency in executive compensation reporting (SEC, 2006; Grinstein
et al., 2015).
We find that target firm CEO compensation indeed changes after activism.
Our results show that target firms pay their CEOs $353 thousand more than their
matched counterparts, in the year of activists’ entry. One year after activism, this
difference disappears. This evidence is consistent with our prior that activist hedge
funds reduce excess overall CEO pay. We further partition CEO pay into individual
components such as the base salary and stock awards. The fixed base salary for
target firm CEOs is not significantly different from matched firms before activism,
but becomes significantly smaller by $41 thousand, two years after activism. In the
year of activism, target firm CEOs receive $321 thousand more than their peers in
terms of stock incentives such as restricted stock and restricted stock units, and
this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. One year after activists’
entry, stock incentives awarded to target CEOs are not different from their matched
equivalents. This result for stock compensation contradicts our prior that activists
push for higher performance–related pay at target firms.
We have two possible explanations for this surprising result. First, stock
awards are not truly fulfilling their role as incentive compensation, but are rather
used to over-compensate CEOs. Although companies assert that stock compensation
is performance based, many incentive plans act to enrich the CEOs without sufficient
returns to firms (Barris, 1992). The second alternative reasoning is that stock
compensation is based on firm performance, and in the absence of activism, stock
awards provide a significant incentive to CEOs to improve firm value. Activism
targets do not have any deficiencies in this respect. However, compensation which
is related to firm performance is expensive, because it exposes risk-averse managers
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to too much volatility in their pay, who would in turn want to be compensated for
the risk and ask for more pay (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013). Once
activists enter a target firm, they decrease stock compensation because they monitor
target firm management anyway, so they do not need to motivate managers through
costly incentive compensation.
To reconcile the stock pay puzzle, we further investigate if performance-
oriented pay such as stock awards are in reality sensitive to firm performance. Our
results show that the sensitivity of CEO stock and total compensation to past firm
performance is significantly higher for target firms, relative to their peers before ac-
tivism, but becomes insignificant one year after activism. Thus, we show that stock
awards are indeed commensurate to target firm performance before activism, and
are not used to over-compensate the CEO. The decrease in pay-for-performance sen-
sitivity after activism is a rather surprising result. We conjecture that this decrease
reflects monitoring by activist hedge funds, which substitutes for incentive-laden
compensation (Hartzell, 1998; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Mehran, 1995). This explanation,
for the decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity after activist entry, is in line
with the fact that activists guide and assist target CEOs in improving firm value,
which diminishes the need for CEO compensation to be made highly sensitive to
firm performance at an extra cost (Edmans et al., 2017).
Activists can assist CEOs by getting involved in decision making, and en-
gaging with target firm management. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that some
hedge fund activists follow ‘constructivism’, aiming to collaborate with management
via private communication such as letters, meeting and informal proposals (AIMA,
2015). For example, an article by Kerr (2008) notes that activist Cevian Capital,
“has an informed and prepared approach to discussion with incumbent management
which opens the way up to constructive dialogue, rather than antipathy”. Activist
Blue Harbour Group states that, “We believe in a private equity approach to in-
vesting: buy in and then help management make changes” (Benoit, 2013).
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Furthermore, our findings also show that three years after activism, around
the time when the activists usually exit (Brav et al., 2008), total and stock compen-
sation in target firms is again more sensitive to firm performance as compared to
matched firms. This result ascribes to the renewed need for CEO compensation to
fill the void left by activists. The increase in pay for performance sensitivity around
the time of activist exit provides further direct evidence that the changes in CEO
compensation in target firms are a consequence of hedge fund activism.
We find that after an activists’ entry, the pay-for-performance sensitivity
of base salary, employee stock options and other compensation is also significantly
lower for target firm CEOs relative to their peers. Given that the rate of CEO
turnover is significantly high at 13.5% in target firms one year after activism, we
also control for CEO turnover. Our results are robust and are not spuriously driven
by firms hiring a new lower paid CEO. This robustness check is analogous to using
CEO fixed effects which makes our identification independent of unobservable CEO
specific characteristics, since it focuses on within-changes in pay for the same CEO.
A point to note in this paper is that we analyze the grant of new equity awards
to CEOs, as opposed to CEO ownership or wealth i.e. the accumulation of equity
(stock and options) by the CEO from previous years. The reason behind considering
equity grants is that we are interested in only those changes in CEO pay which are
directly attributable to an intervention by activist hedge funds. These changes
in pay are implemented by the activists via their influence on the compensation
committee of the board of directors. Any existing equity that the CEO has from
the vesting of prior stock awards is outside the realm of an activist’s direct influence
around the time of targeting, and hence is not of interest for our study.
While the academic literature documents the impact of hedge fund activism
with regards to firm value (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009), bondholders
(Klein and Zur, 2011), mergers (Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Boyson et al., 2016)
and product market spillovers (Aslan and Kumar, 2016); the analysis on activism’s
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impact on CEO pay, an important internal corporate governance mechanism (Denis
and McConnell, 2003), is not thorough and conclusive in the literature at the mo-
ment. Corporate law articles within The Harvard Law School forum on corporate
governance, contain some anecdotal evidence on executive compensation of hedge
fund activism targets, but do not provide any empirical analysis (Goldstein, 2015;
Lipton, 2015). Brav et al. (2008) discuss executive compensation as a part of their
analysis on hedge fund activism’s impact on corporate governance, but very briefly
and with limited data. We attribute this limited analysis on compensation data to
the large-firm-bias in the data provided by ExecuComp.5
By hand-collecting data, we avoid this bias towards large companies, and
present a thorough analysis of CEO pay changes in hedge fund activism targets
which are mostly smaller firms. We also provide a detailed analysis by using granular
data on individual components of CEO pay packages, comprising of a fixed base
salary, short-term performance oriented bonuses, and long-term incentives such as
stock and option grants. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
analyze an important, yet poorly explored, corporate governance impact of hedge
fund activism – that of target firm CEO compensation.
Large institutional shareholders can overcome the free riding problem that
arises in monitoring of management by widely-dispersed shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Institutional
shareholder activism in the United States, in the late 1980s and 1990s, was dom-
inated by traditional shareholders like pension funds and mutual funds. Hartzell
and Starks (2003) analyze mutual and pension funds to find that the ownership
accounted for by the top five institutional investors is negatively related to the level
of executive compensation, and positively to the pay for performance sensitivity
of compensation. However, it is imperative to analyze target firm executive com-
pensation from a separate lens in the instance of hedge fund activism, relative to
5To confirm this bias, we cross reference our list of hedge fund targets, with the data available on
ExecuComp and find that only approximately 20% of hedge fund targets are covered in ExecuComp.
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traditional institutional shareholder activists, because hedge funds are exempt from
regulatory barriers and differently organized.6 Legal rules and agency costs faced
by the traditional institutional shareholders lead to trivial monitoring on their part,
which is not very effective in improving target firm performance (Black, 1998).7
Our result that the entry of hedge fund activists reduces pay-for-performance
sensitivity is indeed suggestive of an alternative approach taken by hedge fund ac-
tivists, relative to other traditional shareholder activists in monitoring firm manage-
ment. In our study, alternative corporate governance mechanisms, more specifically
incentive compensation and activist hedge funds act as substitutes in providing
managerial incentives, in a principal-agent paradigm. This finding is in contrast
to studies in which trivial monitoring by mutual and pension funds, and executive
compensation act as complements, functioning in concert to alleviate management–
shareholder agency problems (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005; Chi-
dambaran and John, 1998).
This paper extends the already well established literature on managerial
incentives and the policy debate on CEO pay. In showing that CEO pay is sensitive
to firm performance, our findings render more support to the argument that the CEO
pay package is an outcome of optimal contracting in a competitive environment, as
opposed to the result of rent extraction by powerful managers (Frydman and Jenter,
2010; Murphy, 2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the data and
present descriptive statistics in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the research design
and provides the main regression results. Section 2.4 concludes.
6Compensation related shareholder activism can also include shareholder proposals on pay and
vote-no campaigns, that target compensation committee members or excessive CEO pay (Ertimur
et al., 2011). But as a low-cost activism mechanism, these proposals function differently from the
costly and large-ownership based hedge fund activism.
7The Investment Company Act, 1940 imposes trading restrictions on investment companies (for
example, mutual funds) such as short-selling of shares and disclosure of investment policy. There are




The approach followed in the literature to identify activism events in the US is to
refer to Schedule 13D filings, that hedge funds file with the SEC when they acquire
5% or more of beneficial ownership of a target firm, with an intention to influence
control (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). Item 2 of this form states the
identity and background of the person lodging the statement. Our activism data
is from Alon Brav (Brav et al., 2013), and contains a list of hedge fund activism
events from 1994 to 2011, with the hedge fund name, target firm name and the date
on which the 13D filing was made.8
From this list, we only consider activism events for publicly listed target
firms, since private firms’ accounting and compensation data is barely available.
We also require activism to have started no sooner than 2009, because of two re-
strictions that we impose on our compensation data collection. Firstly, we collect
CEO compensation data for 7 years, which covers 3 years before the hedge fund
activism year, the activism year itself and 3 years after activism. We are primar-
ily interested in analyzing changes in compensation brought about by hedge fund
activism, and this boundary is useful to establish a ‘pre-post activism benchmark’.
Secondly, we start our compensation data collection from 2006 because of
the implementation of the Revised Financial Accounting Standards No.123 (FAS
123R), related to share-based payments in 2006. FAS 123R introduced changes in
expensing of employee stock options (ESOs) which is an important component of
executive compensation (FASB, 2004a,b). Prior to 2006, most firms do not report
any stock option compensation cost. After the change in regulation in 2006, stock
option costs are reported and recorded as an expense for all firms.9 This change in
8Note that hedge funds can acquire a less than 5% stake in very large firms and still engage in
activism, however, identification of these events is not possible via a 13D filing.
9We conducted a pilot search of compensation data for several firms, which showed that prior
to 2006 most firms do not report any monetary expense related to ESOs. They simply report
the number of shares underlying the option and not enough terms required to compute the option
value. However, after 2006, firms awarding ESOs, report as a monetary expense the option value,
calculated according to an option valuation model.
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regulation affects reporting of ESOs by companies and creates inconsistencies in data
collection before 2006.10 Additionally, not expensing options before 2006, creates a
bias in favour of stock options and against other stock and cash based incentives.
This popularity of option grants stemmed from perceived costs of options being
substantially lower than economic costs (Hall and Murphy, 2003). By analyzing
compensation after 2006, we are able to avoid this bias and analyze stock based
compensation in a fair manner. Also, effective December 2006, the SEC introduced
enhanced disclosure requirements on executive compensation, which provide a more
cohesive report of managerial pay (SEC, 2006). These disclosure rules incorporate
the option expensing changes, require a tabular display of every sub-component
of pay, and create uniformity across firms, thereby making hand-collection more
straightforward.
Applying this post–2009 filter to the initial list of 2684 activism events, we
are left with 463 activist events involving 170 hedge funds/hedge fund groups that
target 412 firms, over a 3-year period from 2009 to 2011.11 The earliest data we have
on compensation is from 2006 (3 years before 2009) and our latest data is from 2014
(3 years after 2011, the last activism date). As a consequence the compensation
data is over 2006 to 2014.
We exclude instances of merger arbitrage from our sample, since their motive
and consequence is different from that of shareholder activism (Brav et al., 2008;
Boyson et al., 2016). We gather data on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) over 2008
to 2013, from Thomson One Banker’s Deals Analysis module. Cross-checking the
M&A data with the hedge fund activism data, we find 63 events involving 52 target
firms where a hedge fund intervenes in the target firm after the announcement of a
merger. As a result of dropping these target firms, our final activism-compensation
sample consists of 400 activism events for 360 targets and 150 hedge funds.
For a meaningful analysis, we need to additionally compare the target firms
10See Appendix 2.5.2 for a detailed explanation.
11Multiple hedge funds can target the same firm.
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to other firms that were not targets of hedge fund activism. By solely comparing
changes in target firm CEO compensation before and after activism, we cannot
establish that these changes are infact caused by activism. We risk introducing
biases in our interpretation as we could merely be capturing a time trend. Thus, we
construct a control sample, by finding industry, size and book-to-market matched
firms, that are not targeted by activist hedge funds, for each of our target firms in the
year of activism.12 More specifically, we use the following algorithm: First, for each
activism target, we find corresponding industry peers, in the year of activism, from
the Hoberg-Phillips TNIC3 database (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016).13 Second,
for our target firms and each of their TNIC3 peers, we obtain their market value
of equity (ME) and the book-to-market (BM) ratio as of activism fiscal year-end,
by using firm level data from Compustat.14 We rank all firms (including the target
firm) across their ME and BM values separately, and scale the ranks by the number
of peers in each TNIC group to come up with a value between 0 and 1. Following
Jayaraman et al. (2015), we compute a pair-wise distance score using the ME and
BM scaled rank scores as follows:
√
(ME rankTarget −ME rankPeer)2 + (BM rankTarget − BM rankPeer)2
Some of our target firms appear as peers for other target firms. We remove these
firms from consideration as peers (after calculating the distance score), since we
require that none of our matched firms be targets of hedge fund activism themselves.
Finally, we select as our matched firm, the peer with the lowest distance score
corresponding to the given target. Thus, we give equal weight to ME and BM in
12Brav et al. (2008) and Ertimur et al. (2011) also create a control group based on these criteria
but on a year-to-year basis. Our matching is done just for the event year, since we want to compare
the evolution of pay in the target to a single matched firm, pre- and post-event.
13The TNIC or Text-Based Network Industries database provides a pairwise similarity score
for every pair of firms, by parsing text-based product descriptions from a firm’s annual 10K fil-
ing. The TNIC3 database is calibrated to be as granular as three-digit SIC codes. A higher
score indicates a higher degree of similarity and firm pairs with a higher score are nearer ri-
vals. See the Hoberg Phillips Data Library for more details on pairwise score construction:
http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/
14ME is the market capitalization of a firm and BM is the ratio of book equity to market equity.
Table 2.1 describes in detail how we construct these variables.
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selecting a match for our target firms from our list of TNIC3 peers.15 Applying the
above algorithm to our 360 target firms, we lose 54 target firms because they don’t
have ME and BM data on Compustat for the given activism year. Additionally,
there are 62 target firms for which we don’t find an industry peer from the TNIC3
database. This results in a final sample of 244 target firms and a corresponding
control group of 244 firms. For these 488 firms we collect CEO compensation data
for 7 years.
We hand-collect compensation data on target and control firm CEOs from the
annual definitive proxy statements or the DEF 14A filings, that are publicly available
on the SEC EDGAR webpage.16 Hand-collection is necessary because hedge fund
targets are usually small firms that are not covered by ExecuComp. The annual
DEF 14A is required by the SEC when an issuer is soliciting shareholder votes
for a company’s upcoming annual meeting.17 Companies must disclose information
concerning the amount and type of compensation paid to its chief executive officer,
chief financial officer and three other most highly compensated executive officers
(termed Named Executive Officers or NEOs), for the last three completed fiscal years
in the proxy statement (SEC, 2006, 2007).18 Our analysis focuses only on CEOs
because we expect the impact of activism on other executive officers’ compensation
to be in the same direction as that of the CEO. We believe that activists are likely
to rally for changes in compensation for the entire executive suite, rather than
consider a different metric for executives lower-ranked than the CEO. Thus, looking
at compensation changes after activism for the CEO alone suffices as a representation
15We also have instances where a given firm appears as a match (with the lowest distance score)
for multiple targets. In such cases, we select a match by minimizing the combined distance of the
first and second best target-peer combination.
16The webpage link: http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
17Section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 requires that an issuer of securities must fur-
nish to each shareholder a proxy statement, if the issuer is soliciting proxies or consents from share-
holders. The definitive proxy statement must be filed with the SEC no later than the date they are
first sent or given to shareholders. (Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-
6)
18Pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K of the Securities Act, 1933 and the new enhanced
disclosure rules of the SEC in 2006.
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of senior management.
The proxy statement includes a Summary Compensation Table, which pro-
vides a comprehensive tabular overview of the company’s total executive pay broken
down into seven categories: dollar values of the salary, bonus and non-equity incen-
tive plans, stock and option based awards, deferred compensation and other kinds
of pay such as perquisites.19
For each of the firms in our sample, we collect data on both total and in-
dividual components of CEO compensation. The base salary represents a fixed
cash-based payment. We take the annual cash bonus and non-equity plan-based
compensation together to represent the bonus component. Stock awards include
restricted stock, restricted stock units, phantom stock, phantom stock units, com-
mon stock equivalent units or other similar instruments that do not have option-like
features (SEC, 2006), and are in terms of grant–date fair value. Option awards are
reported as a compensation cost in terms of their fair market value at the time of
grant. All other compensation includes any changes in pension value, non-qualified
deferred earnings and any other compensation such as perquisites. Total compensa-
tion is calculated by adding all individual components of pay. Our measure of total
compensation corresponds to the TDC1 measure in ExecuComp.
SEC reporting rules confound the distinction between grant-date and real-
ized pay. Cash bonuses are reported when they are realized as commensurate to
performance, while equity awards are reported at grant date fair values. Borrowing
an example from Murphy (2013), consider a CEO that receives a bonus of $10 mil-
lion in January 2012 for performance in 2011, and that $4 million is paid in cash
and the remaining $6 million in stock and options. According to SEC rules, the $4
million cash bonus is reported as part of 2011 compensation, while the $6 million
bonus paid in the form of stock and options is reported as part of 2012 compensa-
tion. In this case, the reported cash bonus in 2011 corresponds to firm performance
19All our annual proxy statements are filed after January 2007, and are therefore subject to both
the FAS 123R and the new SEC disclosure rules.
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in the same fiscal year 2011, while the equity bonus reported in 2012 corresponds
to lagged firm performance in 2011.
We use the reported grant–date values of equity awards, instead of converting
them to realized pay, since the compensation committee of the board, that evaluates
the competitiveness of the CEO pay package at the beginning of the year, focuses on
grant–date pay levels (Murphy, 2013), and any changes to CEO compensation comes
via the board. The literature also uses grant–day values of stock awards (Frydman
and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 1985, 2013). Option grants are more meaningful for our
study since they reflect the board of director’s decision as opposed to option exercises
over which the board has limited control (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). Additionally,
the value realized from option exercises have more to do with optimal managerial
ownership dynamics rather than decisions of the board (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).
We gather accounting data on firm characteristics from Compustat. The
number of compensation data–related observations drop each year as compared to
our sample size of 244 target firms. This drop is because of missing annual proxy
statements on the EDGAR database. Furthermore, we lose some compensation data
for those target firms that undergo an M&A transaction after activism, because their
CEO compensation data is not publicly available since target firms cease public
listing upon the M&A deal completion date.20 For each of our 244 target firms,
CEO compensation is available for atleast one year.
2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.2 depicts a timeline of the effect of hedge fund activism on CEO compen-
sation. The ‘event year’ t0 is the year in which the Schedule 13D is filed, and it
signifies the start of hedge fund activism.21 Compensation awards, in general, are
20We lose data for 4 firms because of a merger in the year of activism, 32 firms because of a
merger one year after activism, and 8 firms for a merger two years after activism. Data is still
available for some of the target firms that had mergers after activism, most likely because those
deals were not yet complete during our sample period.
21Some of the target firms face activism from multiple hedge funds. For target firms which have
more than one activism instance, we consider the activist hedge fund that first filed the 13D as the
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set just before the beginning of a fiscal year and are reported as of fiscal year end in
the proxy statement.22 An activist entering a target firm in the middle of fiscal year
t0, might not always be able to influence compensation awards that have already
been set for t0. Also, activists may start with a general value maximizing intention
and only switch to a more specific objective that impacts CEO pay, over a span of
1 to 3 months after the initial 13D filings.
Moreover, target firms might not immediately agree to the activists’ demands
leading to a period of negotiations or hostility. This lag in implementation of the
activists’ agenda can create a delay in the corresponding adjustment in CEO com-
pensation. Hence, activists can not only impact the compensation award that is to
be paid in the year of activism t0, but also t1, one year after activism is announced.
Appendix 2.5.3 discusses the timeline by using a specific example of the target firm
Midas, Inc. Furthermore, it has been documented that the average holding period
of activists is 22 months (Brav et al., 2008). Thus, it is likely that any influence of
activism on compensation gets less effective after two years.
Table 2.1 defines all variables and provides information on their source of
data. Table 2.2 lists the most popular activist hedge funds in our sample. Gamco
Investors headed by Mario Gabelli leads with 20 instances of activism. Table 2.3
reports the average level of compensation earned by all target and matched firm
CEOs in Panel A, and the median figures in Panel B. To account for outliers,
we winsorize all compensation variables at the 1% and 99% levels. We test for
differences in mean (median) CEO compensation between the target and matched
firms using the t-test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test), and report significance in the
matched firm columns.
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows the evolution of pay over time for the average
main activist and the corresponding activism date as t0.
22t0 is determined on a calendar year basis from the date of the 13D filing, where as the compen-
sation associated with t0 is recorded on a fiscal year basis. For example: A 13D filed on February
1, 2009 for a target firm with fiscal year 2009 ending on March 31, 2010 corresponds to t0 = 2009,
and compensation is recorded for fiscal year 2009.
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target and matched firm CEO. The fixed base salary is at a fairly steady average level
of approximately 0.5 million dollars throughout, for both the target and matched
CEOs. The performance-based cash bonus on average remains significantly higher
for the matched firm CEO over the years until t1, after which the difference becomes
insignificant, although bonus increases on average after activism for target firm
CEOs. Target CEO stock compensation on average is significantly higher than the
matched firm CEO from t−2 to t0. This pattern indicates that target firms, in
comparison to their matched peers, use more stock-based incentives vs. cash-based
incentives before activism. Target CEO stock compensation decreases on average
from t0 to t1, whereas the average value of the stock awarded to the matched firm
CEO increases over the same period. In t2, average stock compensation for the
target firm CEO increases again and becomes significantly higher than the matched
firm CEO. Option awards and other perquisites, on average, are not significantly
different for the target firm CEOs, as compared to their matched counterparts over
the years.
Target firm total CEO compensation is higher than its matched counterpart,
on average, from t−2 to t−1, in terms of economic magnitude but without statistical
significance. But by t1, the average matched firm pays its CEO $350, 000 more than
the CEO of a hedge fund target, in terms of economic magnitude. This observa-
tion confirms with Brav et al. (2008)’s univariate tests showing that activist hedge
funds reduce total CEO compensation in target firms. From t2 onwards, the target
firm CEOs are again paid higher on average than their matched peers, and in t3
this difference becomes approximately $800, 000 and is statistically significant. We
witness a steep rise in total compensation for the average target CEO from around
$2.6 million in t1 to $4.3 million in t3, which stems primarily from a sharp increase
of $0.7 million in stock awards over the same period. The rise in total compensation
from t1 to t3 for the average matched firm CEO on the other hand is not as steep,
increasing by approximately $0.4 million.
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Stock awarded to the CEO as a percentage of total compensation (and as
a percentage of stock plus salary) is significantly higher on average for the target
firm, than the matched firm before activism, but the difference is not significant
after activism. Panel B of Table 2.3 reveals that CEO salary is higher than stock
incentives at the median level (but lower at the mean level), for both target and
matched firms, implying a bigger skew in the distribution of the latter. We also
observe a lower median value of option grants, as compared to stock grants, in the
years following t0. This decline in popularity for option awards can be explained by
the introduction of the FAS 123R option expensing rule, which has caused a shift
away from ESOs to restricted stock and restricted stock units (Frydman and Jenter,
2010; Damodaran, 2005). The difference between total pay for a median target and
matched CEO is negligible. Similar to findings in the literature, compensation values
are amplified when focusing on the average because of skewness in the distribution
of compensation (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).
Panel A of Figure 2.3 plots the average stock compensation for target and
matched firm CEOs. We see that before activism, both target and matched firm
stock compensation shows an increasing trend on average. Post-activism, from t0
onwards, matched firm stock compensation continues to increase. But the target
firm stock compensation drops and then begins to rise post t1. A similar pattern
holds for total compensation in Panel B. Total CEO pay at matched firms increases
gradually from t−3 onwards. At target firms, total compensation initially increases
till t0, then drops and rises again post t1.
In summary, our univariate findings provide an indication that target firm
CEOs are on average paid higher than matched firms before activism, but after
activism, their pay levels are not distinguishable. The data also suggests that stock
awards are the main component of CEO pay affected by activism. Stock compensa-
tion for the target CEOs, as compared to the matched CEOs, is significantly higher
before activism and the difference is not significant one year after activism. Two
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years after activism, target CEOs are again paid higher in stock than their matched
analogue. This pattern evinces that the increase in firm value from activism, might
lower the need to give the CEO incentives to improve firm value. Once the ac-
tivist exits, CEO stock compensation again plays a dominant role in achieving the
shareholder objective of firm value improvement.
Table 2.4 reports the beneficial equity ownership of CEOs in terms of dol-
lar values and as a percentage of shares outstanding. Ownership is a corporate
governance device that helps to align interests between shareholders and managers,
by incentivizing CEOs to improve firm performance (Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi,
2014). Beneficial ownership includes shares underlying options and warrants that
are currently exercisable or exercisable within 60 days after the measurement date,
which is usually the record date. From Panel A, we see that average CEO ownership
at matched firms in all years is substantial at about 6% of all outstanding shares.
However, ownership of target firm CEOs is on average significantly lower than the
matched firms CEOs over all the years, both in terms of absolute dollar values and
as a percentage of outstanding shares, suggesting a need for more direct monitoring
of target CEOs and/or giving them more incentives to increase firm value (Fryd-
man and Jenter, 2010). The median figures in Panel B show the same pattern as
the mean.
Table 2.5 investigates CEO turnover at target and matched firms, which is
identified by checking if the name of the CEO changes from the one in the previous
year. 13.5% of the target firms in our sample have had a change in the CEO from
t0 to t1. This high rate of CEO turnover confirms with the findings of Brav et al.
(2008) who show that after the announcement of hedge fund activism, the CEO
turnover rate at the target firm increases by 10 percentage points. Kaplan and
Minton (2006) also find that CEO turnovers have become more frequent and higher
in firms after 1998 as compared to previous periods. We note that matched firms
show high CEO turnover over time, both before and after activism. The cumulative
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percentage of CEO turnover since hedge fund activism in t3 is around 30% in both
target and matched firms. In running our main regressions in the next section, we
control for CEO turnover in years t0 and t1, at both target and matched firms, as a
robustness check.
We report summary statistics on target and matched firm characteristics in
Table 2.6. From Panel A, we see that there is no significant difference between the
average market value of equity (ME) for the target and matched firm, throughout the
years except for t0, but only at the 15% level. The mean book-to-market (BM) ratio,
also does not exhibit any significant differences between the target and matched
firms, except at the 10% level in t1. This evidence lends support to our matching
technique, in the sense that target and matched firms are indeed similar in terms of
ME and BM. Following (Brav et al., 2008), we use return on assets (ROA) defined
as the ratio of EBITDA to lagged assets, as a measure of operating profitability.
We see that on average, there are no significant differences between the target and
matched firms in terms of ROA, indicating that target firms, though undervalued,
are profitable and do not suffer from operational difficulties. The corresponding
median figures in Panel B show a pattern similar to the average statistics.
2.3 Empirical Methodology and Results
We use an event study research design, combined with a difference–in–differences
identification technique in a panel data framework, for our analysis. We aim to study
the impact of hedge fund activism (our ‘event’ or ‘treatment’) on the compensation
of target firms (our ‘treatment’ group) versus a set of industry, size and book-to-
market matched firms that do not receive treatment (our ‘control’ group). Our
target firms face activism (receive treatment) in three different calendar years –
2009, 2010, 2011, which we normalize as the event year, t = 0. Our objective is to
estimate the ‘treatment effect’, i.e. the change in target firm compensation pre–
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activism (t = −3,−2,−1) and post–activism (t = 1, 2, 3), as compared to matched
firms.
If we analyze changes in only target firm compensation pre– and post–event,
our comparison is biased because any effect could simply be the result of trends.
Even if we control for time-fixed effects, similar in spirit to Aslan and Kumar (2011)
and Pagano et al. (1998), we still cannot establish causality, since any change in com-
pensation could simply be happening because of some spurious correlation between
compensation and activism, rather than changes in compensation being caused by
activism. Again, simply comparing the target and matched firms post-activism is
also biased, as any impact could be the result of permanent differences between the
two groups.
In using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we remove both the
over-time and across-groups biases (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007). We wish to
argue that activism has an impact on CEO pay. Hence, we need to be sure that
some unobserved target firm feature is not causing CEO pay to change even without
the presence of an activist. Therefore, if firms match in all observable ways at the
time of activism, and yet the firms that activists pick are the ones which change
pay, then this effect is likely to be causal.
Since, we are interested in identifying the impact of hedge fund activism on
CEO pay (the treatment effect), it is relevant for our paper to contrast hedge fund
activism target firms to a group of control firms that were not targeted by activist
hedge funds. Comparing hedge fund activism target firms to firms that were targeted
by other shareholder activists (not hedge fund activists) will not completely isolate
the treatment effect. Instead, we will get a noisy capture of the additional effect
of hedge fund activism vis-a`-vis other forms of shareholder activism. Moreover,
this approach would erroneously exclude those firms which did not face any kind of
shareholder activism, hedge fund or other.
We have a panel consisting of both target and match firms, with data on com-
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pensation over the years t = −3 to t = 2. We estimate the following two–way fixed
effects regression specification using a “within” estimator for our firm–level panel
data (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; Wooldridge, 2010; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007;
Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The traditional ‘two-period’ difference-in-differences
model can be thought of as a special case of the two-way fixed effects approach.
yi,t = αi + λt +
3∑
j=−2
βjActi,j + εi,t (2.1)
where the dependent variable yi,t is a CEO pay component for firm i in year t
(t ∈ [−3, 3]), αi and λt are firm and calendar-year fixed effects, respectively. Firm
fixed effects capture the ‘treatment’ dummy, i.e. whether the firm is a target or
match. Calendar-year fixed effects take care of the ‘event-time’ dummies, i.e. the
number of years before or after activism. We do not have to introduce a separate
treatment dummy, because it is perfectly collinear with firm fixed effects since it
does not vary across time for each firm. Similarly, the event-time dummy is perfectly
collinear with year fixed effects because it does not vary across firms.23
Acti,j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a hedge fund
target (belongs to the treatment group), and year t − j is the year of activism.
Acti,j is equal to 0 for all target firms in all years other than t − j. Acti,j is
also 0 for all matched firms in all years. Thus, Acti,j is the typical difference-in-
difference interaction term, that equals one for treated firms in the year t − j and
zero otherwise. In other words, Acti,j is the interaction between the treatment and
event-time dummies. The βj ’s are the difference–in–differences estimators of the
effectiveness of the treatment, thus, our main coefficients of interest. Since, we are
interested in the effect of hedge fund activism over time, we introduce three separate
lags or post-treatment effects in our model (β1, β2, β3), instead of using just a single
dummy that is switched on post-treatment. We also use two pre-treatment leads
23The event-time dummy is analogous to the Post dummy in typical difference-in-differences
regressions, where Post = 1 after event and Post = 0 before event.
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(β−2, β−1) or an anticipatory effect.24 εi,t is the error term. These pre-treatment
leads function as a test of the difference-in-differences parallel trends assumption.
We drop the Acti,−3 dummy in our estimation of equation 2.1.25 Therefore,
a significant positive (negative) βj coefficient on the Acti,j dummies should indicate
that, compared to the average level of compensation in year t−3, a CEO pay compo-
nent is higher (lower) in the years t−2 onwards, for the activism targets as compared
to matched firms.
Table 2.7 provides the estimation results for equation 2.1 for each individual
component of CEO pay. For all estimated coefficients, we report in parentheses
Huber/White heteroscedasticity–consistent standard errors for the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on a given independent variable is equal to 0. The last row
reports the p-value of an F -Test for the null that the estimated coefficients on the
independent variables are jointly equal to zero.
Column 1 shows results for the base salary. Target and matched firm CEOs’
salary is not different before activism, both in terms of economic magnitude and
statistical significance. One year after activism, target firm CEOs are paid $28 thou-
sand less than their peers relative to the benchmark level in t−3, and this difference
is statistically significant. This decline in the base salary conforms to our expecta-
tion that activists reduce that component of pay which is fixed, and not sensitive
to firm performance. In Column 2, we find no significant differences between tar-
get and matched firm non-equity bonuses before and after activism. Though bonus
plans are usually non-linear and are frequently criticized for encouraging excessive
risk-taking (Murphy, 2013), we find that activism does not change the bonuses given
to our target firm CEOs.
From Column 3, we see that the value of the stock awarded to target firm
24Essentially, introducing leads and lags is analogous to using an ‘impact’ function of time, β0(t),
that measures the trend of compensation before and after activism for the target and matched firms
(Andreß et al., 2013).
25We drop Acti,−3 because of the dummy variable trap since we do not drop the intercept term.
Even though we take firm fixed effects, we still have an estimate for the intercept which is nothing
but the average of αˆi across all i, for the time period of the omitted dummy, t−3.
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CEOs is significantly higher than the matched firms, in years t−2, t−1 and t0 relative
to t−3. In the year of activist entry, target firm CEOs earn $321 thousand more in
stock incentives than their peers, and this difference is statistically significant at the
1% level. One year after activism, stock incentives awarded to target CEOs drop
and they are not different from their matched peers. The difference is insignificant
in years t2 and t3 as well. This evidence is in contrast to our prior that performance
related pay improves after the entry of an activist hedge fund. We provide two
possible explanations for this finding.
First, stock awards might not be truly fulfilling their role to motivate CEOs
to improve performance, but are rather being used to over-compensate CEOs as an
alternative to base salary. Although companies assert that incentive compensation
is performance based, many incentive plans enrich CEOs without sufficient returns
to firms (Barris, 1992). Second, the role played by incentives in motivating managers
to improve firm values becomes secondary in the presence of hedge fund activists.
In other words, hedge fund activism acts as a substitute for incentive compensation.
In the absence of activism, stock awarded to target firm CEOs is a signifi-
cant impetus to improve firm value since the CEOs also get a share of this value
improvement. Compensation that is related to firm performance, however, exposes
risk-averse managers to too much volatility in their pay (Frydman and Jenter, 2010),
and is therefore costly for awarding firms. Also, one of the main objectives of hedge
fund activists is to help target firms maximize firm value (Brav et al., 2008). Once
an activist enters a target firm, the compensation committee, in awareness of the
subsequent value improvement that activism will bring about, reduces the burden
of risk imposed by high incentive compensation on CEOs.
We also note that the influence of activism is effective only one year after
entry. This lag captures the fact that sometimes activists might enter a target firm
in the middle of the year, by which time, decisions on pay have already been made
by the compensation committee. Column 4 shows that option compensation does
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not differ significantly for the target firms as compared to the matched firms, before
and after activism. Options lost popularity as a means of compensating CEOs post
the FAS 123R regulation on option-expensing. Given that our compensation data
is post FAS 123R, it implies that activism does not influence ESOs since they were
not widely used during this period in the first place.
Column 5 of Table 2.7, shows that other forms of compensation, such as
perquisites and deferred earnings, are higher for the target firm CEOs than their
peers in year t−2 relative to t−3, after which it begins to decline. Post activism,
in years t1 and t2, this decline in other forms of pay is even steeper. In year t2,
target firm CEOs receive $109 thousand less than their peers in other types of
compensation, and this difference is significant at the 5% level. Perquisites are the
most important component of other forms of pay and have been associated with
rent-extraction by CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A further reduction in CEO
perks post activism highlights the disciplining role played by hedge fund activists.
In Column 6 for total compensation, the coefficients β−2 and β−1 are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% and the 10% level respectively. In terms of
economic magnitude, target firms pay their CEOs $355 thousand ($329 thousand)
more than their matched peers in year t−2 (t−1) as compared to the total pay in
t−3. Total compensation of target firm CEOs substantially declines in t1 in terms
of economic magnitude, and reaches a level which is not significantly different from
their matched peers. This finding implies that target firms pay their CEOs much
more than their peers before the activist’s entry. After activism, total pay of target
firm CEOs declines to a level comparable to their peers, adhering to our conjecture
that hedge fund activism reduces overall pay which is also consistent with the find-
ings of Brav et al. (2008). This pattern in total compensation is driven primarily
by stock awards. In order to establish whether stock awards are over-compensating
CEOs, or whether activism and incentive compensation are substitutes, we further
investigate if pay is in reality sensitive to firm performance.
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As a starting point, we first measure the pay-for-performance sensitivity of
our entire panel of target and matched firms. Following the literature (Murphy,
1999), we use this typical fixed–effects regression to estimate pay-for-performance
relations:
yi,t = αi + λt + δMEi,t−1 + εi,t (2.2)
where yi,t is a CEO pay component for firm i in year t, αi and λt are firm and
calendar-year fixed effects, respectively. MEi,t−1 is the lagged fiscal year-end mar-
ket capitalization of the firm (or firm value) used as a measure of lagged firm per-
formance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).26 27 The estimated coefficient δ measures
the sensitivity of CEO pay to lagged firm performance, for all target and matched
firms in a combined sample (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The estimated intercept
in equation 2.2 is the average of the estimated firm-fixed effect coefficients αˆi, and
captures the fixed or performance-insensitive part of pay. εi,t is the error term.
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the estimation results from equation 2.2. Even
though the base salary constitutes the fixed part of CEO pay, it is positively related
to firm performance with δ = 0.009, similar to estimates in the literature (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). For stock awards, the
intercept term implies that target and matched firm CEOs receive an average stock
pay of $342 thousand for years in which lagged firm value is zero. The estimated ME
coefficient shows that CEOs receive an additional $0.101 in stock for every $1000
increase in firm performance. Total CEO compensation, of both target and matched
firms, is also positively and significantly related to lagged firm performance.
We now investigate how firms’ pay-for-performance sensitivity changes over
time, and differs across target and matched firm. This exercise is analogous to
the difference-in-differences estimation of equation 2.1, just that now we decompose
every individual component of pay into a fixed part and a performance sensitive
26Henceforth, we will use the terms firm ‘value’ and firm ‘performance’ interchangeably.
27We repeat our analysis using current firm performance, and a vector of both contemporaneous
and lagged firm performance (Murphy, 2013), but find qualitatively similar results.
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part. Equation 2.1, on the other hand, analyzes changes in the overall level of
each individual component of pay.28 Therefore, for our panel of target and control
firms, we use the following regression specification to obtain difference–in–differences
estimates of pay–for–performance sensitivities (Cun˜at and Guadalupe, 2009):
yi,t = αi + λt +
3∑
j=−2









γj(Acti,j ∗MEi,j−1) + εi,t
where yi,t is a CEO pay component for firm i in year t, αi and λt are firm and
calendar-year fixed effects, respectively. Similar to equation 2.1, Acti,j is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a hedge fund target (belongs to the
treatment group), and year t − j is the year of activism. Acti,j now captures the
changes in the fixed part of each individual pay component following activism, unlike
equation 2.1 where it captured changes in the overall level of each pay component.
Thus, a significant positive (negative) βj coefficient on the Acti,j dummies should
indicate that, compared to the average level of ‘fixed’ pay in year t−3, the ‘fixed’
part of a CEO pay component is higher (lower) in the years t−2 onwards, for the
activism targets as compared to matched firms.
MEi,t−1 is the lagged firm value, and δ captures the basic pay-for-performance
sensitivity of all firms in the sample. TreatmentDummy is a dummy equal to 1 for
target firms and 0 for matched firms, over all the years. The coefficient ψ captures
the difference in pay-for-performance sensitivity between target and matched firms,
throughout the entire time period. EventT imeDummyi,j is a dummy equal to 1 in
28For example, think of Salary = α+ βFirmPerfomance, where α captures the fixed part and
β, the pay for performance sensitivity. Even though the base salary is not meant to be very sensitive
to firm performance, we still decompose it into a fixed and variable part.
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the year t− j and 0 otherwise, for all firms– target and control. Thus, κj captures
the difference in pay-for-performance sensitivity over time, for all firms.29
The Acti,j dummy is the interaction between the TreatmentDummy and
EventT imeDummyi,j . The interaction of the Acti,j dummy with lagged firm per-
formance MEi,j−1, therefore, captures the change in pay-for-performance sensitiv-
ity, following activism, in target firms as compared to matched firms. Thus, a
significant positive (negative) γj coefficient should indicate that, compared to the
pay-for-performance sensitivity in year t−3, pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher
(lower) in the years t−2 onwards, for the activism targets as compared to matched
firms.30 εi,t is the error term.
Panel B of Table 2.8 reports the results from equation 2.3. For brevity,
we only report the main coefficients of interest – coefficients on the Acti,j dummy,
capturing changes in the fixed part of pay, and coefficients on the Acti,j ∗MEi,j−1
variables, capturing the changes in sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance.
The Acti,j coefficients in Columns 1 to 6, reveal that the fixed part of all CEO pay
components is not significantly different at target and matched firms, both before
and after activism.
The Acti,j ∗MEi,j−1 coefficients in Column 3 show that stock awarded to
target firm CEOs is more sensitive to lagged firm performance relative to matched
peers, in years t−1 and t0. More specifically, in year t−1, stock awarded to target
firm CEOs increases by $0.223 more than peers, for every $1000 increase in past
firm performance. One year after activism, the difference between the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of stock awards at target and matched firms is insignificant.
Year t3 sees an increase in the pay-for-sensitivity difference between target and
matched firms. Column 6 shows that the sensitivity of total compensation to past
firm performance is significantly higher for target firms, relative to their peers from
29In equation 2.1, we do not introduce a separate TreatmentDummy or EventT imeDummyi,j ,
because they are perfectly collinear with firm and year fixed effects, respectively.
30This approach can be viewed as a triple differences analysis.
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years t−2 to t−1 in comparison to year t−3. From year t0 the difference between
pay-for-performance sensitivity at target and matched firms declines, and becomes
statistically insignificant.
But three years after activism, target firm total CEO compensation is again
more sensitive to past firm performance as compared to matched firms. The coef-
ficient on the Act3 ∗ME2 dummy shows that three years after activism, for every
$1000 increase in past firm performance, total compensation of target firm CEOs
increases by $0.332 more as compared to matched firms, and this difference is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The increase in pay for performance sensitivity around the
time of activist exit provides further direct evidence that the changes in CEO com-
pensation in target firms are a consequence of hedge fund activism. We also find that
after activism, the pay-for-performance sensitivity of base salary, employee stock op-
tions and other compensation is significantly lower for target firm CEOs, compared
to their peers. The sensitivity of bonuses to firm performance also declines after
activism, for target CEOs in comparison to their matched counterparts.
These results show that the entry of activists is making target firm CEO
pay less sensitive to firm performance, relative to non-target firms. This relation is
consistent with the notion that activists guide and assist target CEOs in improving
firm value, diminishing the need for CEO compensation to be made highly sensitive
to firm performance, which imposes too much risk on CEOs and an additional cost
on the firm (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013). In other words, monitoring
by activist hedge funds can function as a substitute mechanism, for incentive-laden
compensation that is tied to firm performance (Hartzell, 1998). Three years after
activism, around the time when an activist exits, total and stock compensation at
target firms is again more sensitive to firm performance as compared to matched
firms. This evidence ascribes to the renewed need for CEOs to fill the void left by
activists in improving shareholder value. Our results do not offer support for the
view that target firms use incentives to over compensate their CEOs.
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Our findings contrast with Brav et al. (2008) who find that activism en-
hances pay-for-performance, but a direct comparison of our results to theirs is a
fallacy. This is because Brav et al. (2008) measure pay-for-performance sensitivity
as the percentage of CEO take home pay (including option exercise) that comes
from equity-based incentives, and run univariate t-tests on differences with matched
peers. On the other hand, we estimate direct Jensen and Murphy (1990) type
regressions which are typically used in the compensation literature to assess pay-
for-performance sensitivity. We also consider stock awards as distinct from option
awards, instead of combining the two together as equity awards, because of the
change in option expensing rules post 2006. Moreover, we use option grants instead
of option exercises, because activists can influence an option grant more relative to
an exercise, which is the CEO’s choice.
Furthermore, Hartzell and Starks (2003) in their study of traditional insti-
tutional shareholders like mutual funds, find that pay-for-performance sensitivity
of total pay, cash compensation and option grants is positively related to the con-
centration of institutional ownership. Thus, our finding is suggestive of a different
approach taken by hedge fund activists, relative to other traditional shareholder
activists, in monitoring firm management.
Panel C of Table 2.8 excludes instances of post-activism takeovers of target
firms. This is because in many instances, sale of the target company might be an
objective of hedge fund activism in itself (Brav et al., 2008), which can preclude
changes in CEO compensation after activism. Also, target firm CEOs can negotiate
personal financial benefits during mergers (Hartzell et al., 2004). One-fifth of all
hedge fund targets during 2000 − 2012 received a takeover bid within two years of
activism, and since 2007 this proportion has risen by 24% (Boyson et al., 2016). We
consider only those mergers that happened no later than two years after activism,
since the average holding period of activists is around 22 months (Brav et al., 2008).
57 of our 244 activism targets were taken over after activism and 18 target firms have
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repurchases within two years after activism.31 Since both capital structure changes
and sale of a target company entail objectives that are different from governance-
related activism (Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009), we exclude these
events in Panel C, and run regressions on a smaller sample of 169 target firms (and
their corresponding matched firms). The corresponding results are qualitatively
similar to the full sample in Panel B.
Panels A and B of Table 2.9 present results from further robustness checks.
In Panel A, we report results from equation 2.1, for the sub sample of target firms
that did not have an M&A or share buyback after activism. Our estimates for total
compensation and stock awards for this sub sample are consistent with results from
the full sample as shown in Table 2.7, except for in the year t3. We see that three
years after activism, CEOs belonging to targets that are neither sold nor have had
capital structure changes are paid $724, 000 ($466, 000) more than their peers in
terms of total pay (stock awards), and this difference is statistically significant at
the 5% level. This is in contrast to the results from the full sample, where we find no
significant differences between target and matched firm total or stock compensation
in year t3.
We attribute the above result to the activists exiting a firm after two years,
since the average holding period of activists is around 22 months (Brav et al., 2008).
The results suggest that once an activist exits a firm, the compensation committee
needs to reinstitute incentive compensation to align managerial interests with share-
holders, which in turn drives up total pay. If we include target firms with M&As and
repurchases after activism, this finding no longer holds because the exit of an ac-
tivist would be accompanied by very specific changes to firm strategy, such as a new
ownership or capital structure, and consequently involve specific changes to CEO
compensation. Thus, including target firms with M&As and repurchases can dilute
31Thomson One Banker flags as Repurchases (R) a situation when a company buys back its
shares in the open market, or in privately negotiated transactions, or when a board authorizes the
repurchase of a portion of its shares. These deals have the same firm listed as both the target and
acquiror.
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the results of only looking at the impact of general activism on compensation.32
Given that CEO turnover is high at approximately 13.5% in both target and
matched firms one year after activism, we want to check if the reduction in target
firm CEO compensation post activism is driven by replacing the old CEO with a
new lower paid CEO, or if it indeed comes from a decrease in the incumbent CEO’s
pay. This robustness check is analogous to using CEO fixed effects which makes
our identification independent of unobservable CEO specific characteristics, since it
focuses on within-changes in pay for the same CEO. In Panel B of Table 2.9, we
control for CEO turnover, and exclude both target and matched firms with a change
in CEO immediately after activism, in the years t0 and t1.
33 Our conclusions for
solely those CEOs that remain in the firm after activism, are identical to the results
from the full sample including CEO turnover firms in Table 2.7. Target CEOs’ total
and stock compensation is significantly higher than their peers before activism, and
becomes insignificant after activism. The reduction in pay for target firm CEOs,
post-activism, is not induced by hiring a new CEO who is paid less.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper applies a difference-in-differences estimation technique to firm-level panel
data, to analyze how hedge fund activism influences the compensation of target firm
CEOs relative to their peers. Before the entry of a hedge fund activist, target firm
CEOs receive higher stock and total compensation relative to industry, size and
book-to-market matched peers. Activism is accompanied by a significant reduction
in the level of stock awards and total compensation at target firms, to levels prevalent
at matched firms. Activism further keeps a check on CEO pay at target firms, in the
form of a decrease in base salary and other types of compensation such as perquisites.
32We also estimate regressions involving only those firms that have M&As or repurchases after
activism, but we can’t draw meaningful conclusions from their results since the sample size is very
small.
33We also try alternative specifications where we drop firms with CEO turnover in all years, in
only years post activism, in only target firms, but results are qualitatively similar.
38
Our results are robust to controlling for CEO turnover at target and matched
firms. Reduction in target firm CEO pay, after activism, is not driven by hiring a
new lower-paid CEO. Our findings also hold for a sub-sample of target firms that do
not have takeovers and share repurchases after activism. M&As and share buybacks
are very specific activism objectives that are orthogonal to corporate governance
improvements, and excluding these instances provides a neater picture.
Since stock awards help align managerial interests with firm value, it is sur-
prising to find a reduction in the level of stock awards in target firms, post-activism.
We test if this decrease is induced by target firm CEOs extracting rents prior to
activist entry, in the form of stock compensation which is not sensitive to firm per-
formance. We find that the sensitivity of stock awards and total pay to past firm
performance, is significantly higher for target firms relative to their peers, before ac-
tivism. Thus, our results dismiss the rent-extraction story, by showing that target
firm CEOs were indeed compensated in accordance to firm performance.
Furthermore, we find that activists’ entry is associated with a reduction in
the pay-for-performance sensitivity of target CEOs’ total pay and stock incentives,
as compared to non-target firms. Around the activist’s exit, the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of incentive compensation again increases, suggesting that compensation
and activism act as substitutes. Therefore, the role of incentive compensation in
motivating CEOs to improve firm value, is auxiliary in the presence of monitoring
by activist hedge funds, who can make strategic decisions themselves to maximize
target firm value, in order to increase the value of their own portfolio. Once an
activist exits, incentive pay again becomes pivotal in aligning CEO interests with
the broad shareholder interest of firm value improvement. This result is novel and
undocumented by any previous study in the literature on hedge fund activism.
Overall, we show that hedge fund activists significantly influence the corpo-
rate governance of their target firms, via the specific channel of CEO compensation.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Institutional and Regulatory Background for Hedge Funds
Several barriers limit corporate monitoring by traditional institutional investors like
mutual and pension funds. Public pensions funds are subject to fiduciary responsi-
bilities where broad diversification is considered safe investing (Black, 1990). Also,
fund managers suffer from conflicts of interest in the form of pressure to be pro-
manager for client firms, or pressure from politicians (Black, 1990). Moreover,
money managers might encounter collective action problems in bearing the costs
of disciplining management because of few economic incentives (Rock, 1991). Funds
regulated by the Investment Company Act, 1940, are limited in the types of fees
that they can charge in addition to other shorting and borrowing restrictions (Brav
et al., 2008).
Hedge funds are privately organized investment vehicles that avoid trading
regulations imposed by the Investment Company Act, on institutional investors like
mutual and pension funds, by offering their securities only to high net-worth ($1
million and above) sophisticated investors (Partnoy and Thomas, 2007). Hedge
funds make use of either the Section 3(c)1 or the Section 3(c)7 exemption of the
Investment Company Act. Roughly speaking, Section 3(c)1 limits the number of
investors in the fund to 100, and hedge funds using this exemption offer their se-
curities to mostly ‘accredited’ investors with a minimum net worth of $1 million.
Section 3(c)7 on the other hand, does not limit the number of investors, but places
a higher minimum net worth requirement of $5 million on investors that are deemed
as ‘qualified purchasers’. Hedge funds generally also limit themselves to a maximum
of 35 ‘non-accredited’ investors, in order to comply with Rule 506(b) to be exempt
from the registration requirements of the Securities Act, 1933. Thus, majority of
hedge fund investors are wealthy individuals and hedge fund investments are not
widely available to public investors.
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Hedge funds are run by professional investment managers with significant
equity investments in the fund, and remuneration packages which typically consist
of a fixed annual fee, usually 2% of assets under management, and a bonus equal
to 20% of returns generated. Given the exemption from regulatory barriers and
personal financial incentives, hedge fund managers are motivated to hold highly
concentrated positions in financially healthy, small and ‘value’ firms (Brav et al.,
2008). In order to avoid a perceived takeover threat by the market, hedge funds
quietly accumulate less than 5% of the target’s stock, sometimes alongside a loose
network of other activist investors (Coffee and Palia, 2016; Brav et al., 2016). On
crossing the 5% threshold, hedge funds are required by Section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 1934 to make a Schedule 13D or beneficial ownership report filing
with the SEC, within a 10 day window.
In fact, most of the target’s stock is acquired during this 10 day window, but
activists don’t usually cross the 10% threshold to avoid Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 1934 (Coffee and Palia, 2016; Wong, 2016). This ‘short-swing’ rule
requires any beneficial owner of more than 10% of the security to surrender any
profits realized from the sale and purchase of equity, within any period of less than
6 months. The Section 13(d) regulation applies to those hedge funds which intend to
influence control of the target firm, hence, we define our activism sample to consist
of those hedge funds that file a 13D. Passive institutional investors who acquire a
stake between 5% to 10% in the target firm as a part of the ordinary course of their
business, and not with an intention to influence control of the target, can instead
file a Schedule 13G within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which they
cross the threshold.
2.5.2 FAS 123R Regulation
U.S. firms awarding employee stock options (ESOs) are required to account for them,
by the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the Financial
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Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Prior to 2004, firms were allowed to use the
intrinsic value based method to account for options, as prescribed by the Accounting
Principles Board (APB) in its Opinion 25 (APB, 1972). Effective January 2006, the
new FAS 123R rule made it mandatory that all firms have to use the fair value based
method of accounting for expensing options (FASB, 2004a,b).
Under the fair value method, compensation cost at the grant date is based
on the value of the ESO over the vesting period, calculated using an option pricing
model such as the binomial lattice or Black Scholes. However, under the Opinion
25’s intrinsic value method, firms were allowed to approximate the intrinsic value
of ESOs using simply the exercise value of the options. Because ESOs are usually
granted at the money, the exercise price is equal to the grant day stock price.
Consequently, the intrinsic value of ESOs was usually reported as zero and firms did
not record any expense related to new stock option grants (Damodaran, 2005).
Thus, before 2006, the Summary Compensation Table in the proxy statement
did not report the dollar value of the equity-based awards as a compensation expense,
rather just the number of shares underlying the options. This reporting changed
after 2006, whereby firms were required to show the grant date fair value (in dollars)
of the option award as compensation, in the year in which the grant is made (SEC,
2006).
2.5.3 How Hedge Fund Activism Influences CEO Compensation
To further explain our timeline in Figure 2.2, we provide a specific example of the
CEO of the firm Midas Inc., which was targeted by activist hedge fund Silverstone
Capital LLP. Exhibit 1 presents an extract of the Summary Compensation Table
from the April 2011 Midas’s proxy statement for fiscal year ending December 2010.
On 23-September-2009, Silverstone Capital filed a Schedule 13D with regards
to its ownership in Midas Inc. Thus, the event year t0 is 2009. The difference
between total CEO compensation in fiscal year t0 = 2009 and t−1 = 2008 is only
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$23 thousand approximately. However, there is a decrease in total compensation
from $2.5 million in year t0 to $1.2 million in year t1 = 2010. This decline is
primarily because the CEO is not awarded any equity-based compensation in year
t1, and also because of a slight reduction in other types of compensation. Thus, the
entry of activist hedge fund Silverstone Capital, in t0, can influence decisions of the
compensation committee of target firm Midas Inc., for wages to be paid in t1.
Figure 2.1: Exhibit 1: CEO Compensation from t−1 = 2008 to t1 = 2010
for Midas Inc.
Source: SEC Edgar, DEF 14A filing of Midas Inc., filed on 08-April-2011
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions
This table provides definitions of variables along with information on how we gather data.
Variable Definition Data Source
Acti,j Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a
hedge fund target and if year t− j is the event year,
where t0 denotes the event year i.e. when hedge











Bonus Sum of the annual bonus and any other non-equity
incentive plan compensation of the CEO for the fis-
cal year, reported in 1000s of US dollars, rounded
off to the nearest thousand
Hand Collection:
SEC
Book Equity (BE) Book value of equity calculated as total sharehold-
ers’ equity (SEQ), plus deferred taxes and invest-
ment tax credit (TXDITC), minus the book value
of preferred stock (PSTK) as of fiscal year end, re-







Ratio of Book Equity (BE) to Market Equity (ME) COMPUSTAT,
Own Computa-
tion
CEO Turnover Number of firms with a change in the CEO over a
given period, calculated by checking if the name of




%CEO Turnover Fraction of firms in the sample with CEO turnover




Cumul% Cumulative percentage of firms with CEO turnover




EventT imeDummyi,j Dummy variable equal to 1 in the year t − j and 0






Interaction of the EventT imeDummyi,j with





Market Equity (ME) Market Capitalization calculated as share price
(PRCC F ) multiplied by number of shares out-
standing (CSHO) as of fiscal year end, reported in





continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Data Source
Option Employee stock options (ESOs) awarded to the CEO
for the fiscal year, reported in 1000s of US dollars,
rounded off to the nearest thousand
Hand Collection:
SEC
Other Changes in pension value, non-qualified deferred
earnings and any other compensation such as
perquisites given to the CEO for the fiscal year, re-




Ownership ($MM) Number of shares beneficially owned by the CEO
(including shares underlying exercisable options)
as of the record date, multiplied by share price
(PRCC F ) as of fiscal year end, reported in mil-





Ownership (%) Percentage of the firm’s common shares outstanding






Measure of operating profitability calculated as the
ratio of earnings before interest expense, taxes, de-





Salary Fixed base salary of the CEO for the fiscal year,






Percentage of total compensation paid as base salary Hand Collection:
SEC, Own Com-
putation
Stock Stock-based awards to the CEO for the fiscal year
such as restricted stock, restricted stock units, phan-
tom stock, phantom stock units, common stock
equivalent units or other similar instruments that
do not have option-like features, reported in 1000s















Total Overall Compensation of the CEO for the fiscal year,





TreatmentDummy Dummy variable equal to 1 for target firms and 0
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Variable Definition Data Source
TreatmentDummy ∗
MEi,t−1







Table 2.2: Popular Activist Hedge Funds during 2009-2011
This table presents a list of activist hedge funds with more than four instances of activism during 2009−2011
in our sample. The third column ranks the funds in decreasing order of frequency of activism instances.
Activism is identified as when a hedge fund files a Schedule 13D with the SEC, on acquiring 5% or more of
beneficial ownership of a target firm with an intention to influence control.
Hedge Fund Activism Instances Rank
GAMCO INVESTORS, INC. ET AL 20 1
VA PARTNERS I, LLC 16 2
DISCOVERY GROUP I, LLC 11 3
ICAHN CARL C 10 4
SANDLER ONEILL ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC 8 5
STILWELL JOSEPH 7 6
RAMIUS, LLC 6 7
SRB MANAGEMENT, L.P. 6 7

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: CEO Turnover at Target and Match firms
This table reports the turnover figures of target and matched firm CEOs in our sample. Our CEOs belong
to 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and their
corresponding 244 industry, size and book-to-market matched firms. t0 denotes the event year i.e. when
hedge fund activism occurs or when the Schedule 13D is filed. CEO Turnover denotes the number of firms
with a change in the CEO, calculated by checking if the name of the CEO is different from that in the
previous year. %CEO Turnover is the percentage of firms in the sample with CEO turnover. Cumul%
is the cumulative percentage of firms with CEO turnover since hedge fund activism. Variable definitions
appear in Table 2.1.
Year CEO Turnover %CEO Turnover Cumul% No. of Obs
Target Match Target Match Target Match Target Match
t−2 21 23 8.61 9.43 244 244
t−1 19 24 7.79 9.84 244 244
t0 18 24 7.38 9.84 244 244
t1 33 31 13.52 12.70 13.52 12.70 244 244
t2 25 20 10.25 8.20 23.77 20.90 244 244



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Two-way Fixed Effects Regressions to Analyze the Impact of
Hedge Fund Activism on CEO Compensation
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of hedge fund activism on the compen-
sation of target firm versus control firm CEOs. Our CEOs belong to 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that
were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and to corresponding 244 industry, size and book-
to-market matched firms. For each of the components of CEO compensation, we estimate the following
regression specification using a two-way fixed effects “within” estimator in a panel data framework:




The panel comprises of yi,t, a firm-specific (i) CEO pay component running over 7 years (t) – activism
year, three years before activism and three years after activism. 0 denotes the event year i.e. when hedge
fund activism occurs or when the Schedule 13D is filed. Columns (1) to (6) provide the estimates from each
individual pay component regression. Salary is the fixed base salary. Bonus is the sum of the annual bonus
and any other non-equity incentive plan compensation. Stock consists of stock-based awards like restricted
stock and restricted stock units. Option awards comprise employee stock options. Other is composed of any
changes in pension value, non-qualified deferred earnings and any other compensation such as perquisites.
Total is the overall compensation awarded in the corresponding fiscal year. αi and λt are firm and calendar-
year fixed effects, respectively. Acti,j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a hedge fund
target, and year t− j is the year of activism. εi,t is the error term. Variable definitions appear in Table 2.1.
All compensation figures are in 1000s of US dollars, rounded off to the nearest thousand. All compensation
variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The last row reports the p-value of an F -Test for
the null that the sum of the coefficients on the independent variables is zero. Huber/White robust standard
errors for the null hypothesis, that the coefficient on a given independent variable is equal to 0, are reported
in parentheses. a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Act−2 -3.376 33.962 215.149b -27.198 72.569d 354.960b
(9.374) (56.754) (95.845) (66.488) (49.616) (177.131)
Act−1 -2.160 -8.430 223.376c 59.327 -63.705d 329.344c
(11.709) (75.166) (114.288) (93.531) (41.752) (189.846)
Act0 -4.017 -101.426 321.291
a 6.720 -41.141 353.003d
(14.691) (86.247) (116.414) (92.409) (47.737) (227.401)
Act1 -27.704
d -11.990 63.090 -99.616 -94.396c 51.435
(18.835) (120.668) (147.268) (105.251) (56.148) (304.643)
Act2 -40.687
c 15.198 195.316 45.366 -109.527b 386.851
(22.947) (136.347) (200.313) (117.995) (51.386) (369.750)
Act3 -30.886 -75.896 129.909 -73.143 17.279 270.766
(23.502) (114.557) (216.450) (124.272) (69.670) (354.905)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2882 2882 2882 2882 2882 2882
R2 0.873 0.713 0.678 0.642 0.674 0.819
F -Test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.105 0.004 0.000
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Table 2.8: Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity
This table presents an analysis of the pay-for-performance sensitivity at target and control firms. Our CEOs
belong to 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and
to corresponding 244 industry, size and book-to-market matched firms. In Panel A, we measure the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of our entire panel of target and matched firms. For each of the components of
CEO compensation, we estimate the following fixed effects regression in a panel data framework:
yi,t = αi + λt + δMEi,t−1 + εi,t
The panel comprises of yi,t, a firm-specific (i) CEO pay component running over 7 years (t) – activism
year, three years before activism and three years after activism. 0 denotes the event year i.e. when hedge
fund activism occurs or when the Schedule 13D is filed. Columns (1) to (6) provide the estimates from each
individual pay component regression. Salary is the fixed base salary. Bonus is the sum of the annual bonus
and any other non-equity incentive plan compensation. Stock consists of stock-based awards like restricted
stock and restricted stock units. Option awards comprise employee stock options. Other is composed of any
changes in pension value, non-qualified deferred earnings and any other compensation such as perquisites.
Total is the overall compensation awarded in the corresponding fiscal year. αi and λt are firm and calendar-
year fixed effects, respectively. MEi,t−1 controls for a firm’s lagged market capitalization. The estimated
coefficient δ measures the sensitivity of CEO pay to lagged firm performance, for all target and matched
firms in a combined sample. εi,t is the error term. In Panel B, we provide difference-in-differences estimates
of the impact of hedge fund activism on the sensitivity of pay to firm performance, of target firm versus
control firm CEOs. We estimate the following regression specification using a two-way fixed effects “within”
estimator in a panel data framework:
yi,t = αi + λt +
3∑
j=−2




κj(EventT imeDummyi,j ∗MEi,j−1) +
3∑
j=−2
γj(Acti,j ∗MEi,j−1) + εi,t
Acti,j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a hedge fund target and if year t−j is the year of
activism. Acti,j captures the changes in the fixed part of each individual pay component following activism.
TreatmentDummy is a dummy equal to 1 for target firms and 0 for matched firms, over all the years.
The coefficient ψ captures the difference in pay-for-performance sensitivity between target and matched
firms, throughout the entire time period. EventT imeDummyi,j is a dummy equal to 1 in the year t − j
and 0 otherwise, for all firms– target and control. Thus, κj captures the difference in pay-for-performance
sensitivity over time, for all firms. We interact the Acti,j dummy with lagged firm performance MEi,j−1
to capture the change in pay-for-performance sensitivity, following activism, in target firms as compared to
matched firms. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on the Acti,j dummy, and on the Acti,j ∗MEi,j−1
variable. In Panel C, we re-estimate the regression excluding target (and their corresponding matched) firms
that were sold or had repurchases within two years of activism. Variable definitions appear in Table 2.1.
All compensation figures are in 1000s of US dollars, rounded off to the nearest thousand, and market equity
is in millions of US dollars. All financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The
last row reports the p-value of an F -Test for the null that the sum of the coefficients on the independent
variables is zero. Huber/White robust standard errors, for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on a given
independent variable is equal to 0, are reported in parentheses. a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Panel A: Absolute
Sensitivity
Intercept 474.333a 595.650a 341.585a 562.732a 200.621a 2169.136a
(14.013) (69.539) (130.546) (78.953) (44.873) (214.219)
continued on next page...
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MEt−1 0.009b -0.009 0.101b 0.019 -0.018 0.208b
(0.004) (0.030) (0.043) (0.038) (0.020) (0.095)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2813 2813 2813 2813 2813 2813
R2 0.873 0.713 0.687 0.649 0.677 0.827
F -Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.022 0.000
continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences
Act−2 -3.412 -15.253 100.764 -24.248 37.230 26.192
(10.271) (63.263) (93.782) (68.636) (49.390) (175.619)
Act−1 -1.765 -45.436 20.394 101.060 -42.415 21.221
(12.992) (67.332) (88.887) (88.268) (38.229) (162.867)
Act0 -2.729 -75.613 29.440 54.132 -17.876 -66.913
(16.634) (78.866) (85.884) (91.679) (45.311) (215.102)
Act1 -18.872 63.077 -87.169 -1.217 -73.625
d -1.353
(19.785) (119.268) (117.028) (96.670) (46.844) (285.627)
Act2 -29.628 88.074 125.177 177.068
c 2.807 541.630d
(25.092) (135.310) (194.982) (107.282) (47.027) (361.636)
Act3 -21.001 76.581 -129.778 -48.977 75.011 -207.126
(24.390) (118.116) (164.986) (107.473) (64.676) (326.572)
Act−2 ∗ME−3 -0.005 0.069d 0.077 -0.008 0.022 0.226c
(0.004) (0.044) (0.060) (0.042) (0.026) (0.124)
Act−1 ∗ME−2 -0.002 0.136b 0.223a -0.011 -0.033 0.378a
(0.005) (0.056) (0.068) (0.049) (0.031) (0.092)
Act0 ∗ME−1 -0.007d 0.014 0.161b -0.034 -0.033 0.219
(0.004) (0.046) (0.069) (0.071) (0.030) (0.198)
Act1 ∗ME0 -0.012a -0.065 0.104 -0.023 -0.055 -0.052
(0.005) (0.059) (0.089) (0.063) (0.039) (0.137)
Act2 ∗ME1 -0.011d -0.051 0.062 -0.096c -0.058c -0.075
(0.007) (0.073) (0.115) (0.058) (0.033) (0.157)
Act3 ∗ME2 -0.002 -0.029 0.175c -0.023 -0.048 0.332b
(0.008) (0.041) (0.089) (0.061) (0.043) (0.166)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2813 2813 2813 2813 2813 2813
R2 0.875 0.735 0.720 0.659 0.699 0.840
F -Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Panel C: No Sales
or Repurchases
Act−2 5.650 -54.789 182.645d 32.489 0.051 81.914
(12.432) (85.057) (121.156) (67.937) (64.076) (230.689)
Act−1 7.654 -62.482 87.067 78.378 -64.524 6.357
(15.956) (96.057) (99.798) (82.867) (52.398) (209.227)
Act0 6.429 -58.020 -9.541 59.036 -59.756 -120.607
(17.892) (102.319) (102.922) (84.657) (49.442) (252.003)
Act1 3.833 119.710 36.037 31.734 -79.158 249.758
(19.625) (149.137) (120.811) (90.976) (55.972) (345.583)
Act2 -4.293 145.744 362.937
c 209.846b 0.403 903.609b
(24.638) (161.031) (213.742) (104.958) (55.104) (432.240)
Act3 -2.164 173.073 181.965 -46.491 65.822 198.441
(25.631) (128.292) (176.498) (103.373) (76.133) (363.066)
Act−2 ∗ME−3 -0.009b 0.069 0.083 -0.073 0.005 0.186
(0.004) (0.055) (0.077) (0.051) (0.033) (0.169)
Act−1 ∗ME−2 -0.002 0.151c 0.237a -0.020 -0.078b 0.329a
(0.008) (0.084) (0.084) (0.056) (0.034) (0.124)
Act0 ∗ME−1 -0.011b 0.033 0.189b -0.117c -0.074b 0.176
(0.005) (0.059) (0.093) (0.069) (0.031) (0.236)
Act1 ∗ME0 -0.018a -0.095 0.082 -0.059 -0.097b -0.243c
(0.006) (0.074) (0.093) (0.070) (0.049) (0.147)
Act2 ∗ME1 -0.021b -0.048 0.010 -0.131b -0.109a -0.257d
(0.009) (0.090) (0.073) (0.051) (0.030) (0.164)
Act3 ∗ME2 -0.008 0.000 0.228b -0.004 -0.083c 0.423b
(0.009) (0.045) (0.112) (0.058) (0.047) (0.194)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 1986 1986 1986 1986 1986 1986
R2 0.896 0.722 0.706 0.649 0.733 0.832
F -Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.9: Robustness Checks
This table presents robustness checks for our main difference-in-differences analysis of the impact of hedge
fund activism on the compensation of target firm versus control firm CEOs. Our CEOs belong to 244 U.S.
publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and to corresponding 244
industry, size and book-to-market matched firms. For each of the components of CEO compensation, we
estimate the following regression specification using a two-way fixed effects “within” estimator in a panel
data framework:




The panel comprises of yi,t, a firm-specific (i) CEO pay component running over 7 years (t) – activism
year, three years before activism and three years after activism. 0 denotes the event year i.e. when hedge
fund activism occurs or when the Schedule 13D is filed. Columns (1) to (6) provide the estimates from each
individual pay component regression. Salary is the fixed base salary. Bonus is the sum of the annual bonus
and any other non-equity incentive plan compensation. Stock consists of stock-based awards like restricted
stock and restricted stock units. Option awards comprise employee stock options. Other is composed of any
changes in pension value, non-qualified deferred earnings and any other compensation such as perquisites.
Total is the overall compensation awarded in the corresponding fiscal year. αi and λt are firm and calendar-
year fixed effects, respectively. Acti,j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if firm i is a hedge fund
target, and year t− j is the year of activism. εi,t is the error term. Variable definitions appear in Table 2.1.
In Panel A, we exclude target (and their corresponding matched) firms that were sold or had repurchases
within two years of activism. Panel B excludes target and matched firms with CEO turnover in the year
of activism and one year post activism. All compensation figures are in 1000s of US dollars, rounded off
to the nearest thousand. All compensation variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The
last row reports the p-value of an F -Test for the null that the sum of the coefficients on the independent
variables is zero. Huber/White robust standard errors for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on a given
independent variable is equal to 0. are reported in parentheses. a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Panel A: No Sales or Repurchases
Act−2 3.217 38.821 266.977b 7.148 52.685 439.015c
(11.865) (78.412) (127.505) (74.197) (63.518) (242.660)
Act−1 7.462 14.239 255.251c 43.332 -91.261c 354.326d
(14.349) (103.532) (139.093) (100.894) (49.563) (240.996)
Act0 1.146 -36.527 254.034
c 6.205 -111.647b 273.793
(16.478) (110.922) (140.948) (90.484) (45.071) (273.995)
Act1 -11.531 62.051 134.201 -59.679 -130.476
b 213.879
(18.867) (148.065) (162.488) (105.581) (62.838) (372.426)
Act2 -25.478 117.825 320.655 95.989 -151.991
b 619.426
(23.246) (162.845) (226.680) (124.047) (58.677) (453.460)
Act3 -22.181 61.458 465.587
b -34.094 -41.572 724.432c
(25.743) (124.714) (231.278) (138.115) (80.233) (419.012)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2040 2040 2040 2040 2040 2040
R2 0.891 0.691 0.662 0.613 0.704 0.804
continued on next page...
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F -Test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.171 0.017 0.000
continued on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
Panel B: Excluding CEO Turnover
Act−2 -3.195 37.400 218.941b -33.697 75.137d 357.295b
(9.334) (57.013) (95.939) (66.869) (49.941) (177.627)
Act−1 -3.624 -5.865 228.421b 57.251 -60.061 335.392c
(11.562) (76.182) (115.236) (94.801) (42.516) (192.285)
Act0 5.380 -103.956 319.336
a -44.158 -34.926 311.778
(13.817) (87.806) (121.255) (89.174) (49.594) (234.752)
Act1 -5.205 38.085 103.042 -121.914 -68.024 144.880
(16.013) (127.933) (150.263) (99.678) (60.942) (311.611)
Act2 -45.412
b 6.958 184.474 47.059 -114.260b 361.714
(22.923) (137.541) (201.212) (118.324) (51.675) (372.144)
Act3 -30.356 -78.678 122.509 -86.326 18.975 250.927
(23.677) (114.940) (217.133) (124.197) (69.982) (355.789)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2782 2782 2782 2782 2782 2782
R2 0.888 0.715 0.679 0.654 0.679 0.823



































































































































































































































































































































This figure plots the mean level of compensation of CEOs of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets
of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book-to-market
matched firms. Figures are reported for 7 years – activism year, three years before activism and three years
after activism. t0 denotes the event year i.e. the year in which hedge fund activism occurs or when the
Schedule 13D is filed. Panel A graphs Stock awards which consist of stock-based awards like restricted stock
and restricted stock units. Panel B shows Total compensation which is the overall compensation awarded
in the corresponding fiscal year. Variable definitions appear in Table 2.1. All compensation figures are in




Are Good CEOs a Magnet for
Activist Hedge Funds?
3.1 Introduction
Activist hedge funds constitute a prominent category of institutional shareholders,
who are known to target small and value firms to unlock hidden firm value, in order
to increase the value of their own portfolio (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).
The literature suggests that hedge fund activism generates value because activists
can credibly commit on behalf of shareholders, to intervene and discipline manage-
ment to make firm–value maximizing decisions (Brav et al., 2008).1 This argument
is consistent with a managerial agency view, in which target firm managers take
hidden actions in their own interests and at the expense of shareholders, before an
activist’s entry (Cremers et al., 2017). This view implies that activism targets are
firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanisms, prior to activism. For
example, firms with powerful CEOs who also chair the board thereby reducing its
independence, and firms with entrenched managers who extract rents in the form
1For the remainder of the paper, I use ‘activist hedge funds’, ‘activists’ and ‘hedge funds’ in-
terchangeably. ‘Hedge fund targets’, ‘targets’ and ‘target firms’ have the same meaning. I use
‘matched’ firms, ‘non–target’ firms, ‘control’ firms and ‘peers’ synonymously.
64
of excessive and performance–insensitive compensation. Thus, the agency paradigm
considers hedge fund activists to be champions of dispersed shareholders, who mon-
itor and persuade the managers of poorly governed firms to make shareholder value
their priority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
The literature, however, does not provide an explicit analysis of these CEO–
specific corporate governance features of hedge fund activism targets, before the
onset of activism. In this paper, I use hand–collected data on firms’ CEO–centered
governance variables, and other firm–specific governance and accounting character-
istics to shed light on the entrenchment or bad CEO characteristics hypothesis – do
hedge fund activists really target firms with weaker CEO–realted corporate gover-
nance? In contrast to the claim made in the literature, I find that activists prefer
to target firms with good CEOs, i.e. firms where CEOs are not entrenched and
already have incentives to increase firm value, hence, will work together with ac-
tivists towards a common goal of value improvement – a good CEO characteristics
hypothesis.
I estimate the marginal effect of different CEO–related governance covariates
a year prior to activism, on the likelihood of a firm being targeted a year later. These
governance variables include dummies that capture if the CEO is close to retirement
and if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO duality), dollar values of
individual components of CEO compensation – salary, bonus, stock, options and
other miscellaneous pay, and CEO stock ownership. CEOs near the end of their
careers do not have reputational concerns and might not fear disciplinary sanctions
(Hu and Kumar, 2004). When the CEO is also the chairman of the board, it
reduces board independence, makes internal governance less effective and promotes
managerial entrenchment (Jensen, 1993). Higher cash–based CEO compensation,
such as salary and bonuses that are not tied to firm performance, indicates bad
governance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). On the other hand, stock ownership in the
firm can provide high powered incentives to CEOs to improve firm value.
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My results show that that a one–standard deviation increase in the dollar
value of CEO stock awards, from its sample average, is associated with a 7 per-
centage point increase in the probability of a firm being targeted the next year,
ceteris paribus. Cash based bonuses, on the other hand, are negatively related to
the targeting likelihood. Thus, target firm CEOs receive more equity–based incen-
tives rather than cash–based pay. However, I find that activism target CEOs have
low equity ownership, which justifies the use of more stock awards in target firms,
since equity compensation can succeed in increasing incentives of lower ownership
managers (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). I find that the CEO retirement and CEO
duality dummies do not have any significant impact on the probability of a firm
being targeted by activist hedge funds. Target and non–target firms do not differ
significantly in terms of the retirement and duality variables, before an activist’s
entry. Approximately 11% of target firm CEOs and 13% of control firm CEOs are
near–retirement. 43% of target CEOs and 47% of matched firm CEOs hold the
chairman position as well.
The findings above reflect good CEO characteristics at target firms. Target
firms do not have many CEOs who are difficult to discipline because they are nearing
the end of their careers. Board independence at target firms, as measured by CEO
duality, is at a level similar to peer firms. I also use the proportion of outside
directors on the board as a measure of board independence, and find that both
target and matched firms have fairly independent boards. Around 82% of their
boards is comprised of outside directors. Target CEOs have a low level of stock
accrued from previous years, but, target firms award their CEOs’ with more equity,
as compared to peer firms, which creates incentives for CEOs to enhance firm value,
since they get a share of the value improvement.2
In line with earlier studies, I expect target firms to have a smaller market–
to–book ratio of assets (or q), as compared to non–target firms. Since, target firms
2CEO ownership is different from real–time stock and option grants, because ownership also
includes equity that accumulates from previous years.
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have well–motivated CEOs who should have incentives to increase past performance
because of their high stock awards, I posit that any lower–valuation of target firms
would arise from the lack of an external impetus to augment firm value such as
product market competition. In conformity, I find that prior to activism, target
firms face less competitive pressure from their product markets as captured by a
high Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of product market concentration.
A one–standard deviation increase in the product market HHI index, from its
sample average, increases the probability of a firm being targeted by 7.5 percentage
points, all else equal. Product market competition is a powerful force toward eco-
nomic efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Competition also represents a natural
constraint to the extraction of private benefits of control by a controlling share-
holder (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Absence of an external competitive force can act
as a protective cushion for target firms and dampen value improvement. Activist
hedge funds target these firms and provide that additional momentum in unlocking
dormant firm value. Thus, this lower–valuation of target firms is not because they
are badly governed. Nevertheless, these good CEO measures are not sufficient by
themselves in delivering value improvement, and target firms require an external
push to improve firm value.
As an alternative specification, I use the fraction of total compensation paid
through cash, either salary or bonus, as a measure of cash compensation. I find that
a one–standard deviation decrease in the percentage of cash used in total pay is
associated with a 4.5 percentage point increase in the probability of being targeted,
holding everything else fixed. This result also suggests that target firms had estab-
lished performance–based equity incentives for CEOs, before entry of activists. In
my regressions, I control for a host of other firm characteristics, such as firm size,
R&D expenses, sales growth, return on assets, dividend yield, leverage, diversifica-
tion, analyst coverage and institutional ownership, that can influence the probability
of the firm being targeted by an activist hedge fund (Brav et al., 2008). I also add
67
interaction terms between different covariates but my results remain qualitatively
similar.
As a part of my robustness checks, I also analyze the impact of average
compensation, over the three years prior to activism, on the targeting likelihood
and find similar results. Thus, higher equity pay at target firms is not a recent
change made simply to appease potential activists. Moreover, the findings from
a regression involving total compensation instead of individual components of pay,
show no significant impact of total CEO compensation on the probability of activism.
This result implies that target and matched firms are not significantly different in
terms of overall CEO pay, rather it is the structure of CEO pay that impacts the
activists’ likelihood of targeting.
I also check if CEO incentive pay was indeed sensitive to firm performance in
the years before activism. I find that stock awarded to both target and matched firm
CEOs is sensitive to firm performance, and that there is no difference between the
pay–for–performance sensitivity of the two groups. Thus, prior to activism, target
CEO stock awards were in alignment with firm performance and were not exces-
sive, rendering further support to the prevalence of good CEO–related governance
practices at target firms before activism.
My analysis contributes to two different fields in the literature. Firstly, by
examining target firm characteristics desired by hedge funds in making their ac-
tivism decision, I extend the hedge fund activism literature. I show that in addition
to firm size and value, internal CEO–related governance is a key dimension in target
identification. The academic literature does not provide much evidence linking the
probability of a firm being targeted by activist hedge funds to CEO–related gov-
ernance measures. Few studies, like Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009),
analyze general financial and accounting characteristics of firms before they were
targeted by activist hedge funds. But, these papers do not investigate broader
target firm corporate governance mechanisms particularly with respect to CEOs.
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Brav et al. (2008) use the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index
(GINDEX) to find that target firms tend to have slightly more takeover defenses
(Gompers et al., 2003). But the GINDEX data is only available until 2006 and is
biased towards large firms, as it mostly covers the S&P 1500 companies. Bebchuk
et al. (2009) construct an E-Index based on six corporate governance provisions that
form a subset of the GINDEX which includes 24 corporate governance provisions.
While these two indices provide a broad corporate governance measure, they focus
more on anti-takeover provisions and not on CEO–centered governance mechanisms.
An article by Park (2016) reviews how activists go about identifying attrac-
tive target companies. According to Park (2016), activist hedge funds first conduct
a thorough valuation analysis of the target firm, after which they spend time un-
derstanding the implications associated with the target’s governance structure, of
which executive compensation is an increasingly important component. Corporate
governance mechanisms induce self–value–maximizing managers to make decisions
that maximize the value of the firm to its shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2003).
My paper provides direct empirical evidence of the role played by good CEO–related
corporate governance in target identification.
Moreover, by hand collecting data on compensation and CEO–related vari-
ables and not relying on ExecuComp, I avoid a significant size bias in my analysis.
Hedge fund targets are usually small firms, and ExecuComp contains compensation
data only on fairly large S&P 1500 companies.3 I hand collect data on compensa-
tion for a cross section of 244 U.S. public firms that were activism targets from 2009
to 2011, and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book–to–market matched
non-target firms, from proxy statements filed with the SEC. The data is for three
years prior to activism, and is a subset of the data used in (Fidrmuc and Kanoria,
2017).4
3Hedge funds have to forgo a substantial amount of capital to acquire a meaningful stake in
a large firm, hence, they usually target smaller firms (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009;
Greenwood and Schor, 2009).
4Fidrmuc and Kanoria (2017) have data for 7 years – the year of activism, 3 years before and 3
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The evidence in this paper is indicative of an approach in which activists
prefer to focus on their general goal of firm value improvement and solicit engage-
ment of target firm CEOs (Park, 2016), instead of having to divert more attention
to a specific agency or entrenchment problem. Brav et al. (2008) also find that for
48% of activism events in their sample, hedge funds intend to communicate with the
management on a regular basis with a goal of enhancing shareholder value. Thus,
one can also interpret my findings as a more friendly, rather than confrontational,
relation between activists and management.
The second contribution of my paper is to the vast literature on executive
compensation, by showing that CEOs of activism target firms are not extracting
rents, and that their pay is indeed giving them incentives to increase firm value.
Compensation of executives is considered an important internal governance mech-
anism by those advocating the ‘shareholder value’ view, in which compensation
contracts are tailored to align managerial interests with that of shareholders. On
the other hand, proponents of the ‘rent extraction’ view argue that executives can
influence their own compensation contracts in order to maximize their rents, thereby
debunking the role of compensation in governance (Edmans et al., 2017). Thus, the
evidence on pay, for my sample of activism target firms, belongs to the ‘shareholder
value’ perspective of the debate on pay, as opposed to the ‘rent extraction’ view
(Edmans et al., 2017; Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013).
Though executive compensation is rarely used as a trigger to form the basis
of an entire activism campaign, some anecdotal evidence suggests that hedge fund
activists are increasingly citing excessive compensation as a wedge issue (Goldstein,
2015; Lipton, 2015; Trian Partners, 2015; McCahery et al., 2016).5 This paper,
however, does not find support for the bad governance story. Equity awarded to
target firm CEOs prior to activism is not excessive and is in accordance with firm
years after activism.
5See Appendix 3.5.1 for an example of CEO compensation being used as the bone of contention
in an activism campaign.
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performance.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and
provides descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 discusses the research methodology and
presents regression results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data
I obtain the activism data from (Brav et al., 2013), which contains a list of hedge
activism events from 1994 to 2011 with information on the hedge fund name, target
firm name and the date on which the Schedule 13D filing was made. Hedge funds
in the U.S are required by the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 to file 13Ds with the
SEC when they acquire 5% or more of beneficial ownership of a target firm, with
an intention to influence control (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). The
literature uses these filings to identify activism events. I require target firms to be
publicly listed, since private firms are not required by law to report accounting and
compensation data.
The compensation data is a subset of the hand–collected data we use in
(Fidrmuc and Kanoria, 2017). The data collection begins from 2006 because op-
tion expensing was made mandatory by the FAS 123R regulation in 2006 (FASB,
2004a,b). The accounting treatment of not expensing options before 2006 (APB,
1972) creates inconsistencies in compensation data collection.6 Furthermore, en-
hanced disclosure requirements introduced by SEC amendments in 2006 helps in
collecting more granular data on various sub–components of total CEO pay (SEC,
2006; Grinstein et al., 2015). Since we collect compensation data for 3 years prior
to activism and 3 years post–activism in (Fidrmuc and Kanoria, 2017), we limit the
activism sample to instances of activism that occurred from 2009 to 2011.
After applying this filter to the initial list of activism events and excluding
6See Fidrmuc and Kanoria (2017) for further details on these financial reporting restrictions.
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instances of merger arbitrage, the final sample consists of 360 target firms.7 We then
match these target firms to non–target firms that are similar along the industry, size
and book–to–market dimensions. We use the Hoberg–Phillips TNIC or Text–Based
Network Industries Classification to find industry peers (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010,
2016), and the market value of equity (ME) as a measure of firm size.8 Missing in-
dustry and ME data results in a final sample of 244 target firms and a corresponding
control group of 244 firms.
For these firms, I hand–collect data on CEO beneficial ownership, CEO age,
CEO turnover and other positions held by the CEO such as Chairman of the board
or President, from the annual definitive proxy statements or the DEF 14A filings
that are publicly available on the SEC EDGAR webpage. I use the compensation
data we hand–collect in Fidrmuc and Kanoria (2017) for the 3 years prior to ac-
tivism. The data includes both total and individual components of pay. The base
salary is a fixed cash–based annual payment that does not vary much with firm
performance. Bonus consists of non–equity plan based incentives and ad–hoc cash
bonuses. Stock awards include restricted stock and restricted stock units (RSUs).
Employee stock options (ESOs) form a separate category of pay. Changes in pension
value, non–qualified deferred earnings and perquisites are taken together as “other”
compensation. Equity awards are in terms of grant–date values.
I use BoardEx to get data on the number of outside directors on the board.
I obtain data on the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of product market concen-
tration from the TNIC3 database (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). Since the TNIC3
industry classification is firm–specific and every firm has its unique set of rivals, the
TNIC3 HHI available from the database is also customized to each firm – a firm
level measure. The traditional HHI is the sum of squared market shares of all firms
in a given industry – an industry level measure.
7The motive of hedge funds, who target a firm after a merger has been announced, is different
from that of general shareholder activism (Brav et al., 2008; Boyson et al., 2016).
8See Fidrmuc and Kanoria (2017) for further details on the algorithm used for matching.
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I also need data to control for other firm characteristics that can influence
an activist’s targeting decision. I gather firm–specific accounting and financial data
from Compustat, for example, total assets, R&D expenses, HHI of sales in different
business segments etc. In order to construct the segment HHI, I use Compustat’s
Historical Segments database to gather data on a firm’s sales across various business
segments. For each firm, I calculate the proportion of sales in every segment to total
sales of the firm. Segment HHI for a firm is the sum of all squared proportionate
sales. Data on analyst coverage is from the I/B/E/S database.9 I get institutional
ownership data from the Thomson Reuters 13F institutional holdings database,
which provides data from the Form 13F filed with the SEC by institutional managers
with $100 million or more in assets under management.10
3.2.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 compiles a list of all variables used for analysis, along with their defini-
tions and data sources. Table 3.2 provides summary statistics on the CEO–related
governance variables and firm characteristics. The table compares the mean and
median variable values of hedge fund target firms one year before activism, against
their industry, size and book–to–market matched non–target firms. I report the p–
values from the t–test and the Wilcoxon signed–rank test of differences in mean and
median values, respectively, between the target and matched firms.11 The matched
firm column also displays a symbol for the corresponding statistical significance.
All financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to control for
outliers .
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents CEO–specific governance variables that might
9The analyst coverage data is available on a monthly basis and my analysis is on a yearly basis.
I consider the analyst coverage details from the month closest to the fiscal year end, as applicable
to the whole year.
10The institutional ownership data is available on a quarterly basis, thus, I use the number of
shares held by institutions in the quarter closest to the fiscal year end, as representative for the
whole year.
11For dummy variables, I use only the t–test for differences in mean.
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impact an activist’s target identification decision. I use the CEO Retirement dummy
variable to identify CEOs whose age is close to 65, which is the typical retirement age
for the CEOs of U.S. corporations (Hartzell et al., 2004). CEOs near the end of their
careers do not have reputational concerns and might not fear disciplinary sanctions
(Hu and Kumar, 2004). Roughly 11% of target CEOs and 13% of matched firms’
CEOs are close to retirement. The CEO Chairman dummy variable proxies for CEO
duality i.e. if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. When the CEO is also the
chairman of the board, it reduces board independence, makes internal governance
less effective and promotes managerial entrenchment (Jensen, 1993). 43% of the
target CEOs in our sample also chair the board, and for matched firms this number
is not much different at 47%.
The compensation variables include a breakdown of pay into individual com-
ponents namely salary, bonus, stock, option, all other kinds of pay, total compen-
sation, and the fraction of total compensation that is paid through cash. We see
that one year prior to activism, target firm CEOs on average receive a base salary of
$515, 000 which is not significantly different from their matched peers. The bonus
paid to matched firm CEOs is on average $91, 000 higher than target firms. Target
CEOs are awarded an average of $709, 000 in stock which is higher than the $532, 000
awarded to their matched peers and this difference is statistically significant at the
15% level. On average, there is little difference between option pay and all other
compensation such as perquisites, between target and non–target firms.
Total CEO pay at target firms is $2, 466, 000 on average, which is higher than
matched firms by $129, 000 but with no statistical significance. 59% of total CEO
compensation at target firms is paid through cash, which is slightly lower than the
61% at matched firms. The median values follow a similar direction as the mean.12
Overall, the univariate tests show that it is not the total level of CEO compensation
which is different at target and matched firms, but rather the composition of pay.
12The pay of a median or typical CEO is less than the average, implying that the distribution of
pay in my sample is positively skewed.
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Target firm CEOs are paid more in equity and non–target firm CEOs in cash. The
drop in the number of observations each year, as compared to our sample size of
244 target and 244 matched firms, is because of missing annual proxy statements
on the EDGAR database.
I measure CEO stock ownership through the fraction of outstanding shares
beneficially owned by the CEO. CEO beneficial ownership includes equity securities
such as options and warrants that management can exercise within 60 days of the
record date (SEC, 2006).13 Target firm CEOs own on average approximately 4% of
the shares outstanding as of fiscal year end. On the other hand, non–target firm
CEOs have an average equity ownership of 6.4% which is significantly higher (at the
1% level) than target CEOs’ ownership. Median CEO ownership at matched firms
is also more than ownership at target firms, albeit at a lower level of significance.
Thus, lower prior equity ownership of target CEOs can justify the grant of higher
equity compensation to increase CEO incentives to improve firm value (Ofek and
Yermack, 2000).14
CEO Large Ownership is a dummy variable that captures instances where
CEOs own more than 1% of outstanding equity in a firm. Extraordinarily large
stock ownership of the CEO can function as a high powered incentive to improve
firm value. Similar to the findings for beneficial ownership, we see that 70% of
target firm CEOs own more than 1% of equity in their firms, which is significantly
less than the 80% of non–target CEOs with large share ownership.
Panel B of Table 3.2 provides statistics on firm–specific governance and ac-
counting characteristics, one year prior to activism, which might influence an activist
hedge fund’s decision to target a firm.15 I use the proportion of outside directors
on the board as a measure of board independence, a corporate governance mecha-
13The record date is set by companies to determine which shareholders will receive dividends and
be sent information like proxy statements.
14I also check the ownership levels two years prior to activism, and find the same result that
target firm CEOs had lower ownership in comparison to matched firms. In terms of stock awards,
target firm CEOs receive more stock than their peers two years before activism.
15Table 3.1 gives details of how these variables are constructed.
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nism that can help improve monitoring and disciplining of management(Fama and
Jensen, 1983). Both target and matched firms have fairly independent boards with
roughly 82% of the board consisting of outside directors. The high level of outside
directors on the board for both target and matched firms is not surprising because
of the 2002 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule change, which required that
listed companies have a majority of independent directors (Section 303A.01 of the
NYSE Manual).
The Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of product market concentration
(Product Market HHI) at target firms is 0.24 on average, which is significantly
higher than peer firms’ product market HHI. Market concentration is widely used
as a proxy for product market competition. Lower concentration is interpreted as
more intense competition (Chi and Su, 2013), implying that target firms face less
competitive pressure from their product market. More competition from product
market peers also works as an external monitoring or corporate governance device
(Dyck and Zingales, 2004).
The rest of Panel B reports firms’ accounting characteristics known in the
literature to impact activists’ target selection. I find that on average my target
firms have a slightly lower ME as compared to peer firms, but the difference is
not statistically significant. Target firms also have a significantly lower average
book value of equity (BE). The average level of total assets at target firms is $1799
million which is significantly lower than the $2603 million value at matched firms,
consistent with the literature’s finding that activists target smaller firms (Brav et al.,
2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). In terms of q, defined as the ratio of market value of
assets to book value of assets, I find that target firms have an average q of 1.4 which
is lower than the average q of 1.8 at non–target firms. The difference is statistically
significant at the 1% level, indicating that activist hedge funds target lower valuation
firms (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).
Research and development expenditure scaled by lagged total assets (R&D)
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is on average significantly lower at target firms relative to matched firms, implying
that activists avoid high–tech firms (Brav et al., 2008). The average growth rate
of sales in target firms is approximately 4.5 percentage points lower than matched
firms in terms of economic magnitude, though the difference is not statistically
significant. This evidence suggests that target firms tend to be low growth firms.
Though target firms are low growth firms, they do not have profitability issues as
can be seen from similar levels of return on assets (ROA) in target and match firms.
Dividend yield at target firms is 0.014 which is half of the non–target firms’ level,
and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, in accordance with the
lower levels of dividend payout observed by Brav et al. (2008). Looking at capital
structure, the book value of debt scaled by total assets (Leverage) is slightly higher
on average at target firms, albeit with no statistical significance.
The HHI index of sales in different business segments (Segment HHI), used
as a proxy for diversification (Brav et al., 2008), is at a similar average level of
0.83 for both target and matched firms. The high segment HHI level suggests
that both target and matched firms are not very diversified. Less diversification is
good for shareholders who might find it cheaper to diversify themselves via their
individual investment portfolios (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). The average number
of analysts covering target firms is approximately 4 which is similar to matched
firms in terms of economic magnitude, but higher in terms of statistical significance.
Both target and non–target firms have a high institutional ownership of 59% on
average. Analyst coverage and institutional ownership both act as proxies for a
sophisticated shareholder cliente`le, whose support is desired by activist hedge funds
in implementing their agenda (Brav et al., 2008).
Moreover, some of the above general firm characteristics also function as
corporate governance mechanisms. For example, low dividend yield may be viewed
as an outcome of poor corporate governance.
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3.3 Results
I use a probit model to identify the partial effects of CEO–related governance vari-
ables and firm–specific governance and accounting characteristics on the likelihood
of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge fund.16 I pool the target and non–target
firms together to form a combined cross–section of firms, for the probit estimation.17
Table 3.3 presents results from the probit regression. The dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a hedge fund activism target and zero oth-
erwise. All independent variables are lagged by a year, i.e. their values are for one
year prior to activism. For all estimated covariate coefficients, I report, in paren-
theses, the Huber–White robust standard errors associated with the null hypothesis
that the coefficient is 0. I also report the percentage point change in the marginal
probability of being targeted, stemming from a one–standard deviation change in a
given explanatory variable from its average, all else equal. Since activism events in
my sample happen over the years 2009 to 2011, I also include year–fixed effects for
the years 2008 to 2010 because all the covariates are lagged. The table also provides
the unconditional probability of a firm being targeted which is the percentage of
target firms included in the regression. The last two rows report the McFadden
pseudo R–squared value, and the p–value from a Wald test that the parameters of
interest are simultaneously equal to zero.
The main variables of interest in Table 3.3 are the CEO retirement and
chairman dummies, individual components of compensation and CEO ownership.
In addition to the CEO chairman duality variable, I also include the proportion of
outside directors on the board as an extra control for board independence. Columns
1 to 3 include different controls for firm characteristics.18 As a starting point, I
16Unreported results from a logistic model have similar implications.
17See Appendix 3.5.2 for a detailed description of the probit model specification.
18Note that in all regressions I convert the dollar values of the compensation variables into $
million, for their respective coefficients to have a meaningful interpretation. If I take compensation
in a denomination of $ thousand, the coefficients are numbers with zeros up to the 4th decimal
place. This conversion, however, does not impact the marginal probability changes column because
it is standardized. For the same reason, I also transform the dollar value of total assets into $
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first control for those firm accounting characteristics which significantly influence
the targeting probability by themselves, i.e. I estimate regressions (unreported)
involving just one independent variable which is the given firm characteristic. These
variables are product market HHI, q, R&D, sales growth, and dividend yield. I find
that R&D and q are highly positively correlated (around 70%) since they are both
proxies for a firm’s technological intensity, and that the significance for R&D goes
away when we include both R&D and q in a regression. Moreover, lack of data on
q leads to a drop in the number of observations, as can be seen from the summary
statistics in Table 3.2. Thus, I initially exclude q from my analysis and consider the
other aforementioned variables in the regression specification shown in Column 1. I
add a precautionary control for total assets because the univariate findings indicate
that target firms are smaller than matched firms.19
From Column 1 of Table 3.3, we see that near retirement CEOs and those
who also chair the board, have no significant impact on the likelihood of a firm being
targeted. CEOs near the end of their careers can be difficult to discipline because
they do not fear threats to their reputation. CEOs who also chair the board, can
become very powerful and render board independence and monitoring ineffective. I
find that target firms do not differ from non–target firms on the basis of the close
to retirement and CEO duality governance features.
A one–standard deviation decrease in the dollar value of cash bonuses, from
its sample average, increases the marginal probability of being targeted by 7 per-
centage points, other things equal. Similarly, a one–standard deviation increase in
CEO stock awards, from its average, is associated with a 7 percentage point in-
crease in the marginal probability of being targeted, ceteris paribus. The increase is
substantial given that the unconditional probability of being targeted is 46%. This
finding implies that activist hedge funds prefer to target firms with lower cash–based
billion.
19Excluding total assets does not change the results. If I use ME instead of total assets, the
results are qualitatively similar except that the coefficient on ME is not significant.
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and higher stock–based CEO compensation. Cash based bonuses provide low pow-
ered incentives to CEOs to increase firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Compensation contracts tied to long–run stock performance, align the incentives of
CEOs with shareholders and reduce non–value maximizing decision making by man-
agement (Lewellen et al., 1987; Hall and Liebman, 1998). This evidence shows that
activism targets are firms with good CEO–related corporate governance mechanisms
set up prior to the activists’ entry, which can help further the activists’ agenda to
improve firm value.
The fixed base salary, employee stock options and other forms of compensa-
tion have no significant impact on the marginal probability. CEO large ownership
is significantly negatively related to the targeting probability, indicating that target
firm CEOs do not have high levels of beneficial ownership of equity. CEO ownership
is different from equity compensation because ownership also includes stock that has
accumulated from previous years. Less accrued stock from previous years for target
firm CEOs explains the higher equity grants given to them. Ownership of equity
helps align managerial interests with stockholders, and measures to increase CEO
ownership reflect good CEO–related internal governance practices at target firms
prior to activism.
Board independence at target firms, as measured by the proportion of outside
directors on the board, is not different from peer firms.20 Target firms face less
competitive pressure from their product markets, as reflected by a higher HHI index
of product market concentration. Product market competition can function as an
external governance mechanism similar to the market for corporate control (Allen
and Gale, 2000). Therefore, we see that target firms do not have weak internal
governance, but rather a missing external lever in the form of lower product market
competition which can make target firms complacent, and warrant the need for
20Given that both target and matched firms have a high proportion of outside directors on the
board, roughly 82%, I use the direct proportion of outside directors as an independent variable in
my regressions. Unlike Hu and Kumar (2004), I do not use a dummy variable to identify boards in
which the proportion of outside directors is above some minimum threshold, such as 40% or 60%.
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hedge funds to push for value improvement.
In terms of firm characteristics, the coefficients from the probit regression
support my univariate findings. Activists avoid targeting larger firms (lower total
assets) because that would require them to shell out a sizable amount of capital
in order to build a meaningful stake. Target firms have low technological intensity
(lower R&D), and since R&D can be thought of as a proxy for q, target firms are low
growth firms. In terms of operational performance, as measured by sales growth,
there is no significant difference between target and matched firms. Activists also
target firms with a lower dividend payout. This evidence is consistent with the
results of Brav et al. (2008), who also find that activists are “value” investors that
target small firms, with issues that are generalizable to all firms such as payout
policies, rather than issues like slipping sales which are specific to a small number
of firms.
In Column 2 of Table 3.3, I add two more explanatory variables to the re-
gression, namely ROA and Analyst Coverage. I still exclude the variables Leverage,
Segment HHI and Institutional Ownership, because of a lack of data which leads to a
drop in the number of observations. Results from this regression remain unchanged
from the previous one. ROA is negatively related to the targeting probability, which
implies that target firms are less profitable.21 If I drop R&D from the regression
(unreported for brevity), the coefficient on ROA is no longer significant and all other
results remain the same. Thus, the significance of ROA is possibly coming because
of a correlation with R&D. 22 Analyst Coverage has no significant impact on the
likelihood of being targeted.
The specification in Column 3 includes all variables which leads to a drop in
the number of observations. However, I drop R&D from the regression because of
its high correlation with q. Results from the initial regression still hold. However,
21The same conclusion holds if I use cash flows instead of ROA as a measure of operating prof-
itability.
22ROA and R&D of the firms in my sample are strongly negatively correlated (−74%).
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because of a drop in the number of observations, the statistical significance of some
variables changes. For example, the effect of bonus on the marginal probability
becomes insignificant, primarily because a drop in the number of observations is
making the impact of other forms of compensation and total assets more significant.
Target firms have a lower q which confirms that activists are “value” investors. Ex-
cluding R&D results in the ROA explanatory variable becoming insignificant. The
drop in observations also makes the influence of Dividend Yield and Product Market
HHI on the marginal probability less significant. For this smaller sample, we see that
target firms also have higher leverage, are less diversified as shown by a higher HHI
index of sales in different business segments, and have more analyst coverage which
is indicative of a sophisticated cliente`le. But the statistical significance of these
variables is the result of a drop in the number of observations, thus, immaterial in
drawing an overall inference.23 24
The p–values from the Wald test show that my covariates are jointly sig-
nificant in explaining the targeting probability. The pseudo–R2 values are low but
unlike the R2 associated with linear models, we cannot interpret the pseudo–R2
value as the proportion of response variance that can be explained by the regressors
(Hu et al., 2006).
Table 3.4 re–estimates the probit regression using the percentage of total
CEO compensation paid through cash as the main compensation variable, instead
of the individual components of pay. Also, I now measure CEO ownership by the
fraction of outstanding shares beneficially owned by the CEO, instead of a large
ownership dummy variable. CEO Retirement and CEO Chairman dummies have
no significant impact on the targeting probability. From columns 1 and 2, we see
23I estimate several unreported probit regressions trying different combinations of the explanatory
variables from Column 3 of Table 3.3. I find that is indeed a drop in the number of observations
which causes some variables to be more or less significant, in influencing the marginal probability
of being targeted.
24I also introduce several interaction terms between the compensation variables, firm charac-
teristics and other governance terms, but they do not change my results or have any meaningful
interpretation.
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that one–standard deviation decrease in the fraction of CEO cash compensation,
from its sample average, increases the marginal probability of being targeted by
4.5 percentage points, other things held equal.25 The impact is considerable given
that the unconditional probability of being targeted is 46%. This evidence supports
the findings from Table 3.3, that target firms award their CEOs higher equity, a
good CEO–related governance practice. Similar to the first probit regression, CEO
ownership of equity from prior years is lower at target firms.
The regression coefficients on all other covariates in Columns 1 to 3 of Ta-
ble 3.4, have a similar interpretation as that of Table 3.3. Activist hedge funds are
value investors who target small low–tech firms, with a lower dividend payout and
less competitive pressure from product markets relative to peers. The only differ-
ence is that now the proportion of outside directors is negatively and significantly
related to the marginal probability of being targeted, which suggests that target
firm boards are less independent. But given that both target and non–target firm
boards consist of 82% outside directors, the influence of board independence on the
targeting probability is inconsequential.
Table 3.5 carries out some additional tests to find further support for the good
CEO–related governance story. The first check helps to address concerns that target
firms might have changed CEO compensation just prior to activism, to improve
governance as a precaution against being potentially targeted. In Panel A, I use
average compensation and ownership over the three years prior to activism as the
main explanatory variables influencing the probability of being targeted, instead of
considering recent values just one year before activism. Column 1 uses the fraction
of compensation paid as cash, averaged over the three years prior to activism, as the
main independent variable.26 CEO ownership is also an average over three years.
25In unreported regressions, I add the percentage of total compensation paid as other compensa-
tion, such as perquisites, as an explanatory variable in Table 3.4, but my results are qualitatively
similar. Alternatively, I also use the percentage of total compensation paid through equity to find
similar implications.
26I also control for CEO turnover in this regression, but my results remain qualitatively similar.
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The results show that target firms have had low levels of CEO cash compensation
on average, relative to non–target firms, throughout the three years before activism.
Thus, compensation paid through cash has not been recently lowered. Furthermore,
even equity ownership of target firm CEOs has been low across the three years prior
to activism.
Similarly, in Column 2, the main covariates are the individual components of
pay, averaged over the three years prior to activism. Confirming with the results in
Column 1, I find that cash–based bonuses at target firms have been lower on average,
over the three years before the firm was targeted. Target CEOs also have high stock
awards relative to peers across the three years prior to activism.27 Therefore, a high
level of equity awarded to target firm CEOs is not a recent governance improvement
to ward off and pacify activists, but rather a governance “culture” built over the
years to give CEOs incentives to increase firm value.
The evidence up until now is consistent with the good CEO characteristics
story. But to negate the bad governance story, we need to directly investigate
if CEOs are extracting rents in the form of excessive compensation. Panel B of
Table 3.5 checks if the total CEO pay at target firms is different from that of non–
target firms. Column 1 shows that overall level of CEO pay, one year prior to
activism, does not significantly influence the marginal probability of a firm being
targeted by activist hedge funds. The coefficients on the other explanatory variables
are similar to previous regression specifications. This finding confirms that activist
hedge funds are not targeting firms with weaker corporate governance, whose total
CEO pay levels are excessive relative to peer firms. It is more the composition
of pay – higher equity and lower cash – that significantly influences the targeting
probability.
Column 2 re–estimates the regression by using average total compensation
27I also analyze the level of compensation separately for each of the three years prior to activism,
but find similar results. I even estimate regressions to check for changes in compensation but the
results are both economically and statistically insignificant.
84
over the three years prior to activism as the key explanatory variable. Average total
compensation, over the three years prior to activism, does not have any statistically
significant impact on the probability of a firm being targeted. Thus, total compen-
sation at target firms was not excessive relative to peer firms from much before, and
this is not a recent phenomenon. In other words, it is prevailing good CEO–related
governance at target firms that attracts activist hedge funds, because it helps their
agenda to improve target firm value. Weaker prior governance at target firms might
dampen the value enhancement process in terms of additional confrontation costs
and delays.
I further examine if compensation awarded to target firm CEOs was in ac-
cordance with firm performance and not excessive, by investigating the pay–for–
performance sensitivity in sample firms. Using a panel consisting of target and
matched firms over the three years prior to activism, I estimate the following two–
way fixed–effects regression specification :
yit = αi + λt + γMEit + δ(MEit ∗ TargetDummy) + εit
where yit is a firm–specific (i) CEO pay component over years t = −3 to t = −1. αi
and λt are firm and calendar–year fixed effects respectively. MEit is a measure of
current firm performance calculated as the firm’s market value of equity as of fiscal
year end (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).28 The coefficient γ captures the absolute
pay–for–performance sensitivity at both target and matched firms in a combined
sample (Murphy, 1999). MEit ∗ TargetDummy is an interaction term between
firm performance and a TargetDummy equal to one if the firm is an activism
target.29 The coefficient δ on this interaction term captures the difference in pay–
for–performance sensitivity between target and non–target firms. εit is the error
28I also re–estimate the equation using lagged firm performance but find similar results.
29Since I use firm–fixed effects, I do not need to include the TargetDummy variable separately
by itself, because it is perfectly collinear with firm–fixed effects.
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term.
Table 3.6 provides the estimation results. Stock awarded to both target
and matched firm CEOs before an activist’s entry is sensitive to firm performance.
An increase in current firm performance by $1000, implies an estimated increase in
stock awards by $0.075, as seen from the MEt coefficient. Total CEO compensation,
for both target and control firms before activism, is also positively related to firm
performance. The coefficient on the MEt∗TargetDummy interaction term for both
stock awards and total compensation is statistically insignificant, implying that
the pay–for–performance sensitivity at target and matched firms before activism
is not significantly different. These results confirm that prior to activism, target
(and matched) firm CEOs were not extracting rents by receiving pay that was not
sensitive to firm performance. Prior to an activist’s entry, target firm CEOs in fact
receive equity incentives that are aligned with firm performance, thereby rejecting
the entrenchment or bad governance hypothesis.
3.4 Conclusion
I examine the corporate governance preferences of activist hedge funds in target
identification. The focus of my paper is on CEO–related governance variables as
a specific measure of target firm internal corporate governance. The literature on
activism suggests that activists target lower–valued firms with poor corporate gov-
ernance, and enhance firm value by monitoring and discipling management – a bad
CEO characteristics hypothesis. This paper, on the contrary, finds that prior to
being targeted, firms have strong CEO–specific internal governance mechanisms in
place, with CEOs who are motivated to improve firm performance – a good CEO
characteristics story.
Probit regressions help to identify the partial effects of CEO–related gov-
ernance variables, and firm–specific governance and accounting covariates on the
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probability of a firm being targeted by activist hedge funds, the next year. The
main governance variables are dummies to capture CEOs close to retirement and
CEOs who also chair the board, dollar values of individual components of CEO pay,
and CEO equity ownership. I also control for other firm–specific characteristics like
total assets, R&D expenses, dividend yield etc. that can influence the probability
of being targeted.
The results show that target CEOs have a low level of stock accrued from
previous years, but, target firms award their CEOs’ with more equity, as compared
to peer firms, which creates incentives for CEOs to enhance firm value. Specifically,
a one–standard deviation increase in the dollar value of CEO stock awards, from its
sample average, is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of
being targeted, all else unchanged. Very few target CEOs lack reputational concerns
because they are near the end of their careers. Board independence at target firms,
as measured by CEO duality, is at a level similar to peer firms. Target firms also
have a very high proportion of outside directors on the board. The findings above
reflect good CEO–related governance features at target firms, prior to an activist’s
entry.
I find that target firms are lower–valued, but they are not weakly governed.
Good internal governance mechanisms, however, are not sufficient by themselves in
delivering value improvement. Target firms lack some external impetus to augment
firm value, as shown by the result that target firms face less competitive pressure
from their product markets. Competition acts as a check on target firms, and
absence of a competitive force from product markets can make firms economically
inefficient. Activist hedge funds can provide the necessary and additional push
needed to increase firm value.
In an alternative specification, I consider the percentage of cash used in total
compensation as the sole compensation covariate. Consistent with earlier results, I
find that prior to activism, target firms have a lower percentage of CEO compen-
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sation paid through cash as compared to non–target firms. Additional tests reveal
that the high level of equity awards in target firms, prior to activism, is not a re-
cently implemented measure to appease activists, but has been in place over three
years prior to activism. Moreover, total CEO compensation at target firms does not
have any significant impact on the targeting likelihood, implying that it is not the
level, rather the structure of CEO pay that matters to activists. Checks for pay–
for–performance sensitivity also show that before activism, target firm CEOs indeed
receive incentives that are in accordance with firm performance, further indicating
that CEOs are not extracting rents.
My findings are consistent with the view that activist hedge funds are inclined
towards target firm CEOs who are driven to improve firm value, thereby serving
the activists’ agenda of unlocking dormant firm value. Weakly motivated target
firm CEOs can not only dampen the process of value improvement, but also create
additional costs for activists, such as a long negotiation and confrontation period
with entrenched CEOs. Overall, my analysis shows that good prior CEO–centered
corporate governance practices at target firms are attractive to activist hedge funds,
who aim to increase the value of their own portfolio by improving target firm value.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Anecdotal Evidence on Compensation Related Hedge Fund
Activism
A recent (2015) example of an activist hedge fund campaign, which succeeded in
using managerial compensation as a lever to gain representation on the board of a
target company, is that of Marathon Partners Equity Management LLC. The hedge
fund, a long–time shareholder in Shutterfly Inc, an American Internet based image
publishing company, wrote an open letter to shareholders expressing concerns related
to Shutterfly’s ‘consistently troubling executive compensation program’. Marathon
ended up winning two seats on the board and Shutterfly agreed to change the metrics
used to set executive bonuses (Hoffman, 2015; PRNewswire, 2015).
Jana Partners LLC (in 2015) took a $2 billion stake in the San Diego based
chip–maker Qualcomm, and criticized its compensation policy of calculating stock
based incentives using a definition of operating profits that excluded the cost of stock
based compensation. The hedge fund asked for a better alignment of management’s
incentives with the owners, by tying stock grants to earnings per share and return on
invested capital. Qualcomm conceded to these plans by adding three Jana Partners–
approved members to the board (Tilley, 2015; Gara, 2015; McSwain, 2015).
3.5.2 Probit Model
The probit model has a binary dependent variable, in this case a dummy “Ac-
tivism” equal to one if the firm is an activism target and zero otherwise. Let X be
the vector of all explanatory variables such as CEO–specific governance variables,




The probit model can be derived from an underlying latent variable model (Wooldridge,
2009). Consider a latent or unobservable variable z∗ such that
z∗ = α+ βX + 




1 if z∗ > 0
0 if z∗ ≤ 0
Therefore,
Prob(Activism = 1|X) = Prob(z∗ > 0|X)
= Prob(α+ βX +  > 0|X)
= Prob[ > −(α+ βX)|X]
= 1− F [−(α+ βX)]
= F (α+ βX)
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Since the probit
model is non–linear, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation is not applicable.
Thus, I use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) methodology for estimating
the probability of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge fund.
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions
This table provides definitions of variables and information on data sources.
Variable Definition Data Source
Analyst Coverage Number of analysts covering a firm for the fiscal year I/B/E/S, Own
Computation
Bonus Sum of the annual bonus and any other non-equity
incentive plan compensation of the CEO for the fis-
cal year, reported in 1000s of US dollars, rounded
off to the nearest thousand
Hand Collection:
SEC
Book Equity (BE) Book value of equity calculated as total sharehold-
ers’ equity (SEQ), plus deferred taxes and invest-
ment tax credit (TXDITC), minus the book value
of preferred stock (PSTK) as of fiscal year end, re-












(%) Percentage of total compensation paid in cash, in-




CEO Chairman Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the






Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO owns more






CEO Ownership (%) Percentage of the firm’s common shares outstanding
beneficially owned by the CEO (including shares un-





CEO Retirement Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is 65 years




Dividend Yield Ratio of common dividend (DV C) plus preferred
dividend (DV P ) to the sum of common equity
(CEQ) and book value of preferred stock (PSTK),






Proportion of outstanding shares, for the fiscal year,
held by institutional shareholders with more than





Leverage Ratio of book value of debt to book value of assets
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Variable Definition Data Source
Market Equity (ME) Market Capitalization calculated as share price
(PRCC F ) multiplied by number of shares out-
standing (CSHO) as of fiscal year end, reported in













Option Employee stock options (ESOs) awarded to the CEO
for the fiscal year, reported in 1000s of US dollars,
rounded off to the nearest thousand
Hand Collection:
SEC
Other Changes in pension value, non-qualified deferred
earnings and any other compensation such as
perquisites given to the CEO for the fiscal year, re-








Product Market HHI Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of product mar-




q Ratio of market value of assets to book value of as-
sets (AT ) as of fiscal year end. Market value of as-
sets is calculated as market equity (ME) plus book




R&D Research and Development Expenses (XRD), as of






Measure of operating profitability calculated as the
ratio of earnings before interest expense, taxes, de-
preciation and amortization (EBITDA), as of fiscal




Salary Fixed base salary of the CEO for the fiscal year,




Sales Growth Growth in net sales (SALE), as of fiscal year end,




Segment HHI Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of sales in dif-
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Variable Definition Data Source
Stock Stock-based awards to the CEO for the fiscal year
such as restricted stock, restricted stock units, phan-
tom stock, phantom stock units, common stock
equivalent units or other similar instruments that
do not have option-like features, reported in 1000s
of US dollars, rounded off to the nearest thousand
Hand Collection:
SEC
TargetDummy Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is




Total Overall Compensation of the CEO for the fiscal year,




Total Assets Book value of Assets (AT ), as of fiscal year end COMPUSTAT
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the mean and median statistics for CEO–specific governance variables and firm charac-
teristics of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and
their corresponding 244 industry, size and book-to-market matched firms. Panel A reports CEO–specific
variables and Panel B provides statistics on firm characteristics. All variable values are for the year prior
to activism and variables are defined in Table 3.1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
The table reports the p–values from the t–test and the Wilcoxon signed–rank test of differences in mean and
median values, respectively, between the target and matched firms. The matched firm column also displays
a symbol for the corresponding statistical significance. a, b c and d indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.
Mean Median
Panel A: CEO Characteristics
Target Match p–val Target Match p–val Obs.
CEO Retirement (%) 10.61 12.63 0.52 198
CEO Chairman (%) 43.28 47.26 0.40 201
Salary ($1, 000) 515 530 0.54 444 473 0.97 198
Bonus ($1, 000) 410 501d 0.13 141 133 0.84 198
Stock ($1, 000) 709 532d 0.12 130 49c 0.07 198
Option ($1, 000) 581 520 0.56 74 65 0.50 198
Other ($1, 000) 175 176 0.96 26 31 0.65 198
Total ($1, 000) 2466 2337 0.61 1030 1160 0.61 198
Cash
Total (%) 58.73 60.68 0.44 62.01 59.61 0.45 198
CEO Ownership (%) 3.96 6.42a 0.004 1.86 2.33d 0.13 194
CEO Large Ownership (%) 70.30 79.70a 0.01 202
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Target Match p–val Target Match p–val Obs.
Outside Director (%) 82.37 81.94 0.61 85.71 85.71 0.67 198
Product Market HHI 0.245 0.187a 0.00 0.168 0.134a 0.00 227
ME ($MM) 1110 1325 0.18 157 213 0.41 235
BE ($MM) 707 1081b 0.05 132 194 0.27 183
Total Assets ($MM) 1799 2603b 0.05 361 422 0.84 242
q 1.427 1.814a 0.00 1.189 1.230b 0.03 181
R&D 0.052 0.087c 0.06 0 0 0.29 242
Sales Growth (%) 4.599 9.142 0.20 -0.148 1.806c 0.07 237
ROA 0.048 0.038 0.58 0.070 0.077 0.72 234
Dividend Yield 0.014 0.028a 0.02 0 0a 0.00 242
Leverage 0.497 0.479 0.60 0.437 0.404 0.23 183
Segment HHI 0.831 0.826 0.84 1 1 0.53 181
Analyst Coverage 3.843 2.983a 0.01 2 0.5a 0.00 242
Institutional Ownership (%) 58.89 59.59 0.79 62.01 62.87 0.51 156
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Table 3.3: Probit Analysis of Targeting Likelihood
This table presents the estimates from a probit model to identify the partial effects of CEO–specific gov-
ernance variables and firm characteristics on the likelihood of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge
fund. The CEOs belong to a pool of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism
during 2009 to 2011, and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book–to–market matched firms. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a hedge fund activism target and zero otherwise.
Independent variables are defined in Table 3.1. All independent variables are lagged by a year, i.e. their
values are for one year prior to activism. Columns 1 to 3 include different controls for firm characteristics. In
each column, I report the estimated coefficient and the percentage point change in the marginal probability
of being targeted, stemming from a one–standard deviation change in a given explanatory variable from
its mean, all else equal. Huber/White robust standard errors, for the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on a given independent variable is equal to 0, are reported in parentheses. The unconditional probability
of a firm being targeted is the percentage of target firms included in the regression. The last two rows
report the McFadden pseudo R2 value, and the p–value from a Wald Test that the parameters of interest
are simultaneously equal to zero. All compensation figures are in terms of millions of US dollars, and total
assets is in billions of US dollars. All financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. a,
b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob.
(% points) (% points) (% points)
CEO Retirement -0.168 -2.148 -0.193 -2.483 0.022 0.262
(0.211) (0.084) (0.213) (0.085) (0.288) (0.114)
CEO Chairman -0.074 -1.455 -0.068 -1.355 -0.106 -2.095
(0.141) (0.056) (0.142) (0.057) (0.184) (0.073)
Salary -0.152 -1.769 -0.147 -1.710 -0.505 -5.780
(0.346) (0.137) (0.356) (0.141) (0.491) (0.194)
Bonus -0.222c -7.166c -0.197c -6.425c -0.160 -4.907
(0.119) (0.047) (0.119) (0.047) (0.150) (0.059)
Stock 0.147b 7.345b 0.171b 8.391b 0.218b 10.970b
(0.070) (0.028) (0.075) (0.030) (0.091) (0.036)
Option 0.094 4.239 0.077 3.523 0.064 3.298
(0.075) (0.030) (0.078) (0.031) (0.089) (0.035)
Other 0.082 1.967 0.064 1.532 0.375c 9.273c
(0.147) (0.058) (0.149) (0.059) (0.198) (0.078)
CEO Large Ownership -0.322b -5.534b -0.327b -5.646b -0.559a -9.315a
(0.160) (0.063) (0.163) (0.065) (0.202) (0.080)
Outside Director -0.824 -2.909 -0.900 -3.181 -0.239 -0.840
(0.803) (0.318) (0.817) (0.325) (1.053) (0.416)
continued on next page...
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Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob.
(% points) (% points) (% points)
Product Market HHI 1.020a 7.523a 0.976a 7.254a 0.819c 6.276c
(0.373) (0.148) (0.377) (0.150) (0.456) (0.180)
Total Assets -0.032d -6.338d -0.039c -7.748c -0.094a -17.351a
(0.021) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.030) (0.012)
q — — — — -0.228a -10.513a
(0.080) (0.032)
R&D -1.223c -5.672c -1.888b -8.852b — —
(0.702) (0.278) (0.761) (0.302)
Sales Growth -0.003 -3.978 -0.002 -3.527 -0.003 -4.454
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ROA — — -0.931c -5.734c -0.384 -2.549
(0.549) (0.218) (0.579) (0.229)
Dividend Yield -3.438b -6.678b -2.665c -4.976c -0.799 -1.515
(1.472) (0.584) (1.503) (0.597) (1.884) (0.744)
Leverage — — — — 0.606c 6.985c
(0.345) (0.136)
Segment HHI — — — — 0.796b 7.834b
(0.370) (0.146)
Analyst Coverage — — 0.005 0.993 0.031d 6.902d
(0.016) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008)
Institutional Ownership — — — — -0.306 -3.573
(0.382) (0.151)
Calendar–year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional Probability 45.98% 46.80% 45.21%
No. of Obs. 398 391 261
Pseudo–R2 0.065 0.070 0.108
continued on next page...
96
...continued from previous page
Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob.
(% points) (% points) (% points)
Wald Test 0.005 0.005 0.004
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Table 3.4: Probit Analysis using Percentage of Cash in CEO Pay
This table presents the estimates from a probit model to identify the partial effects of CEO–specific gov-
ernance variables and firm characteristics on the likelihood of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge
fund. The CEOs belong to a pool of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism
during 2009 to 2011, and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book–to–market matched firms. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a hedge fund activism target and zero otherwise.
Independent variables are defined in Table 3.1. All independent variables are lagged by a year, i.e. their
values are for one year prior to activism. Columns 1 to 3 include different controls for firm characteristics. In
each column, I report the estimated coefficient and the percentage point change in the marginal probability
of being targeted, stemming from a one–standard deviation change in a given explanatory variable from
its mean, all else equal. Huber/White robust standard errors, for the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on a given independent variable is equal to 0, are reported in parentheses. The unconditional probability
of a firm being targeted is the percentage of target firms included in the regression. The last two rows
report the McFadden pseudo R2 value, and the p–value from a Wald Test that the parameters of interest
are simultaneously equal to zero. Total assets is in billions of US dollars. All financial variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. a, b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and
15% levels respectively.
Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob.
(% points) (% points) (% points)
CEO Retirement -0.096 -1.237 -0.108 -1.398 0.097 1.157
(0.209) (0.083) (0.213) (0.085) (0.295) (0.117)
CEO Chairman -0.042 -0.829 -0.022 -0.431 -0.015 -0.290
(0.139) (0.055) (0.142) (0.056) (0.188) (0.074)
Cash
Total -0.426
d -4.496d -0.431d -4.499d -0.720c -7.633c
(0.270) (0.107) (0.290) (0.115) (0.373) (0.148)
CEO Ownership -1.960b -6.758b -2.214b -7.737b -2.376c -8.079c
(0.918) (0.364) (0.930) (0.369) (1.255) (0.496)
Outside Director -1.235d -4.357d -1.364d -4.822d -0.449 -1.581
(0.824) (0.327) (0.837) (0.333) (1.073) (0.424)
Product Market HHI 1.053a 7.806a 1.029a 7.683a 0.882c 6.835c
(0.381) (0.151) (0.386) (0.153) (0.460) (0.182)
Total Assets -0.024c -4.734c -0.029b -5.727b -0.044b -8.022b
(0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008)
q — — — — -0.201b -9.340b
(0.080) (0.032)
R&D -1.312c -6.134c -2.060a -9.737a — —
(0.731) (0.289) (0.787) (0.312)
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Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob. Coeff. Marg.Prob.
(% points) (% points) (% points)
Sales Growth -0.003 -4.119 -0.002 -3.597 -0.003 -5.466
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ROA — — -1.051c -6.511c -0.164 -1.097
(0.551) (0.219) (0.587) (0.232)
Dividend Yield -3.191b -6.198b -2.285d -4.265d -1.211 -2.299
(1.513) (0.600) (1.520) (0.604) (2.021) (0.799)
Leverage — — — — 0.631b 7.310b
(0.317) (0.125)
Segment HHI — — — — 0.639c 6.321c
(0.351) (0.139)
Analyst Coverage — — 0.005 1.037 0.026 5.681
(0.015) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008)
Institutional Ownership — — — — -0.643d -7.521d
(0.393) (0.155)
Calendar–year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Unconditional Probability 45.92% 46.75% 45.53%
No. of Obs. 392 385 257
Pseudo–R2 0.054 0.060 0.083
Wald Test 0.006 0.004 0.050
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Table 3.5: Robustness Checks
This table presents robustness checks for the main probit model to identify the partial effects of CEO–specific
governance variables and firm characteristics on the likelihood of a firm being targeted by an activist hedge
fund The CEOs belong to a pool of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism
during 2009 to 2011, and their corresponding 244 industry, size and book–to–market matched firms. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm is a hedge fund activism target and zero otherwise.
Independent variables are defined in Table 3.1. All independent variables are lagged by a year, i.e. their
values are for one year prior to activism. In Panel A, I use average compensation and ownership, over the
three years prior to activism, as the main explanatory variables. Column 1 uses the fraction of compensation
paid as cash and Column 2 uses the individual components of pay. Panel B checks if total CEO pay at
target firms is different from that of non–target firms. Column 1 uses the overall level of CEO pay one year
prior to activism, and Column 2 uses average total compensation over the three years prior to activism. In
each column, I report the estimated coefficient and the percentage point change in the marginal probability
of being targeted, stemming from a one–standard deviation change in a given explanatory variable from
its mean, all else equal. Huber/White robust standard errors, for the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on a given independent variable is equal to 0, are reported in parentheses. The unconditional probability
of a firm being targeted is the percentage of target firms included in the regression. The last two rows
report the McFadden pseudo R2 value, and the p–value from a Wald Test that the parameters of interest
are simultaneously equal to zero. All compensation figures are in terms of millions of US dollars, and total
assets is in billions of US dollars. All financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. a,
b, c and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
Dependent Var: (1) (2)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob.
(% points) (% points)
Panel A: 3 Year Averages
CEO Retirement -0.061 -0.809 -0.126 -1.627
(0.219) (0.086) (0.216) (0.085)
CEO Chairman -0.029 -0.565 -0.049 -0.957
(0.147) (0.058) (0.147) (0.058)
Cash
Total -0.866
b -7.634b — —
(0.362) (0.143)
Salary — — 0.128 1.431
(0.410) (0.162)
Bonus — — -0.409b -12.876b
(0.161) (0.063)
Stock — — 0.179c 7.578c
(0.093) (0.037)
Option — — 0.063 2.366
(0.102) (0.040)
Other — — 0.187 3.903
continued on next page...
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Dependent Var: (1) (2)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob.
(% points) (% points)
(0.186) (0.074)
CEO Ownership -1.511d -5.231d — —
(0.950) (0.374)
CEO Large Ownership — — -0.346b -5.876b
(0.167) (0.066)
Outside Director -1.247 -4.318 -0.742 -2.546
(0.914) (0.360) (0.853) (0.336)
Product Market HHI 0.887b 6.421b 0.879b 6.382b
(0.400) (0.158) (0.386) (0.152)
Total Assets -0.025d -4.894d -0.024 -4.642
(0.015) (0.006) (0.023) (0.009)
R&D -2.145b -10.210b -1.401c -6.576c
(0.914) (0.359) (0.765) (0.302)
Sales Growth -0.002 -2.613 -0.002 -2.979
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Dividend Yield -3.165b -6.474b -3.539b -7.120b
(1.576) (0.620) (1.556) (0.614)
Calendar–year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Unconditional Probability 44.09% 44.72%
No. of Obs. 347 369
Pseudo–R2 0.058 0.064
Wald Test 0.012 0.009
continued on next page...
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Dependent Var: (1) (2)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob.
(% points) (% points)
Panel B: Total Compensation
CEO Retirement -0.164 -2.098 -0.168 -2.169
(0.210) (0.083) (0.212) (0.084)
CEO Chairman -0.100 -1.982 -0.058 -1.137
(0.139) (0.055) (0.142) (0.056)
Total 0.037 5.144 — —
(0.027) (0.011)
Total 3 year average — — 0.019 2.597
(0.033) (0.013)
CEO Large Ownership -0.333b -5.735b -0.301c -5.104c
(0.157) (0.062) (0.165) (0.065)
Outside Director -0.817 -2.882 -0.590 -2.027
(0.789) (0.313) (0.834) (0.329)
Product Market HHI 0.997a 7.354a 0.926b 6.726b
(0.367) (0.146) (0.383) (0.151)
Total Assets -0.043b -8.500b -0.029 -5.766
(0.019) (0.007) (0.023) (0.009)
R&D -1.123c -5.209c -1.230c -5.777c
(0.680) (0.270) (0.735) (0.290)
Sales Growth -0.003 -3.947 -0.002 -3.455
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Dividend yield -3.192b -6.202b -3.279b -6.603b
(1.440) (0.571) (1.515) (0.598)
Calendar–year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Unconditional Probability 45.98% 44.72%
No. of Obs. 398 369
Pseudo–R2 0.053 0.046
continued on next page...
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Dependent Var: (1) (2)
Target Dummy
Coeff. Marg. Prob. Coeff. Marg. Prob.
(% points) (% points)
Wald Test 0.003 0.027
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Table 3.6: Pay for Performance Sensitivity
This table presents the pay–for–performance sensitivity estimates of sample firms. I use a panel consisting
of 244 U.S. publicly listed firms that were targets of hedge fund activism during 2009 to 2011, and their
corresponding 244 industry, size and book–to–market matched firms, over the three years prior to activism.
I estimate the following two–way fixed–effects regression specification :
yit = αi + λt + γMEit + δ(MEit ∗ TargetDummy) + εit
where yit is a firm–specific (i) CEO pay component over years t = −3 to t = −1. αi and λt are firm and
calendar–year fixed effects respectively. MEit is a measure of current firm performance calculated as the
firm’s market value of equity as of fiscal year end. (MEit ∗ TargetDummy) is an interaction term between
firm performance and a TargetDummy equal to one if the firm is an activism target. εit is the error
term. Columns (1) to (6) provide the estimates from each individual pay component regression. Variable
definitions are given in Table 3.1. Huber/White robust standard errors, for the null hypothesis that the
coefficient on a given independent variable is equal to 0, are reported in parentheses. The last two rows
report the R2 value, and the p–value from an F–Test that the sum of the coefficients on the independent
variables is zero. All compensation figures are in terms of thousands of US dollars, and ME is in millions
of US dollars. All financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. a, b, c and d indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salary Bonus Stock Option Other Total
MEt -0.001 0.125
a 0.075b -0.127a 0.028b 0.148a
(0.003) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.014) (0.053)
MEt ∗ TargetDummy -0.004 0.025 -0.050 0.138a -0.005 0.105
(0.005) (0.031) (0.050) (0.040) (0.023) (0.086)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar–year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1291 1291 1291 1291 1291 1291
R2 0.950 0.795 0.722 0.779 0.744 0.899
F–Test 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.043 0.000
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Chapter 4
Incentives for Bankers to Reveal
Risk
4.1 Introduction
This paper considers a well diversified bank at its optimal level of overall risk, and
explores an incentive system that enables the bank to screen and extract information
about the risk associated with individual asset classes.1 In a principal-agent model,
in which bankers possess better information about the asset class risk and the bank
wants access to that information, I find that the bank designs remuneration tailored
to the risk reported by bankers. Bankers can be paid entirely in fixed wages or
in performance-related bonuses, depending on the risk of their trades, such that
the bank can get truthful revelation of project risk. This formulation captures
traditional investment banks and their asset managers, who engage in risky trades
like currencies, commodities and complex derivatives (Skypala, 2011).
Bankers’ incentives continue to elicit a public outcry, especially in the wake of
the financial crisis, over how they stimulate excessive risk-taking by bankers under
the cushion of limited liability. People view bonuses with scepticism, and often
1Throughout this paper, I use the terms ‘asset class’, ‘project’ and ‘trade’ interchangeably.
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perceive bonuses as encouraging bankers to hide risk by betting against small odds
over a long period of time (Taleb, 2009). Financial regulators across the globe
have now formulated stricter rules for the banking sector. The Bank of England
in July 2014 proposed regulations that could send reckless bankers to jail, and
suggested a deferral of bankers’ bonuses by at least seven years (Pickard and Schafer,
2014). The EU bonus cap, which limits the European Union’s bankers’ bonuses
to not more than twice their salary, also came into effect in 2014 (Barker, 2013).
These measures, adopted by the regulators of the banking sector, emphasize the
importance of aligning risk with reward, and set out incentives which impact risk-
taking activities of bankers.
My paper, however, focuses on the role of incentives in encouraging risk-
revealing behaviour of bankers. The bank always stays within a predetermined
overall optimal risk limit, and the bank tries to monitor the risk of individual
projects, such that they always aggregate up to the optimal level. I do not ana-
lyze a situation where the bank aims to get individual bankers to take less risk, as I
assume all risk to be managed optimally at the overall bank level.2 The bank makes
the risk taking decision, in essence, in its allocation of resources across the balance
sheet. Rather, the bank’s objective is to maximize profits, subject to getting the
banker to truthfully reveal risk when he is better informed than the bank. Thus, my
analysis establishes banker remuneration as a tool to not just reward bankers, but
also as a screening device for project risk. The bank subsequently uses information
on risk to allocate resources for investment to the banker.
The model analyzes a scenario in which a profit-maximizing, risk neutral
bank– the principal– delegates the task of managing risky value enhancing projects
to a risk neutral banker– the agent– who is required to report the risk of his asset
class to the bank. I measure risk as the variance of the random returns the asset
2This optimal level of risk can be thought of as being determined uniquely for the bank, by a
trade-off between the increase in equity value from increasing risk, and the decrease in equity value
due to financial distress costs associated with increasing risk (Stulz, 2014).
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class generates. On the basis of this risk report, the bank provides the banker some
compensation for his services. These compensation contracts ex-ante satisfy con-
straints on banker participation and ensure that the banker is truthful about project
risk. The paper starts with an illustrative model of two project types, High risk and
Low risk, with discrete returns, and then moves on to a more realistic framework
with continuous project returns. I extend the model to include costly effort on part
of the bankers to increase returns, which leads to remuneration contracts getting
further constrained by the additional task of motivating bankers to exert effort.
Results from the paper show that the first-best, complete information com-
pensation contract offers each type of banker a remuneration, which in expected
value pays just as much as the outside option of the banker. This compensation
contract can take any form, for example, either a fixed wage or performance varying
pay, amongst many others. However, it is unrealistic to assume that banks and
bankers have equal information, since bankers involved in day-to-day trading have
better knowledge about the risk associated with a project. Under asymmetric in-
formation and the adverse selection problem, the bank can still achieve a positive
separation of types without leaving any information rent for the banker, as in the
first-best case. But, the fully general remuneration scheme breaks down and in or-
der to prevent bunching of types, the bank has to offer the Low type a fixed wage,
and the High type a performance varying bonus. When moral hazard interacts with
adverse selection, the bank can no longer separate banker types by simply paying
both types an amount equal to their outside option. Bonuses need to be paid to
both types of bankers, with the High type getting an information rent to achieve a
separating equilibrium.
The findings of this paper demonstrate how bankers choose a bonus con-
tract when they have a higher probability of achieving high returns, albeit a risky
prospect, and want a share of that higher return. Their choice, in turn, reveals to
the bank that the banker manages a more risky asset class. The reported risk helps
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the bank in allocating resources across the balance sheet for investment in different
asset classes, thereby promoting better risk management. This approach comple-
ments Ang (2013), who suggests that ‘investing right’ involves looking through asset
class labels for the underlying risk factor.
The model treats the resources available for investment in individual asset
classes as exogenously set, for instance, by external regulation or Value at Risk
(VaR) limits. Also, I consider a model stretching over just one period, to capture
the importance of extracting risk information in a short space of time. Banks are
better able to assess employees’ risk-adjusted results if they remain at the bank long
enough, for the consequences of their strategy to materialize (Sepe and Whitehead,
2014). My analysis applies specifically to a bank, and not to any general profit
making organization with a principal-agent problem, because the model sets wages
as a function of risk. Screening for risk is imperative for a bank, while it may be
less important for other corporate entities.
To develop an appropriate risk governance paradigm and establish a well
founded risk culture within a bank, it is crucial to be well informed about indi-
vidual project risk (Stulz, 2014). The functioning of good risk management and
risk governance within the bank, helps in better compliance with the norms set by
external regulatory institutes. This need for internal risk management forms the
backbone of this paper, and via this channel my paper contributes to the ongoing
policy debate on banks’ risk and bankers’ compensation, in both the financial press
and academic literature.
Some empirical studies in the literature put perspective to the theoretical
model analyzed in this paper. The results of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show
worse performance of banks when CEO incentives were aligned with shareholder
objectives. With the absence of agency conflicts, they explain that CEOs took
unforeseen risks that looked profitable ex-ante, but resulted in a bad outcome ex-
post, which led to poor bank performance. On the contrary, Bebchuk et al. (2010),
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in their analysis of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, indicate that the design
of firms’ performance based compensation provided executives with incentives to
improve short term results, at the cost of maintaining a high level of risk of future
implosion. Thakor (2014) explains that banks hold assets whose risks might be
correlated across other banks. Bank failures create externalities for other sectors of
the economy, and this possible contagion can lead to a collapse of the entire banking
system.
The rest of this section discusses the related literature. Section 2 introduces
the model, followed by section 3 which presents the analysis of remuneration under
adverse selection. Section 4 analyzes the wage contract under both adverse selection
and moral hazard. Section 5 concludes.
4.1.1 Related Literature
Risk Governance
My motivation, to build the model as one in which individual banker risk
is crucial, comes from the theoretical review on risk management and governance
provided by Stulz (2014), and the references therein. Though the paper by Stulz
(2014) does not present a working model, it highlights the need for identifying and
measuring bank risk in order to promote an appropriate risk culture within the bank,
as supported by the Financial Stability Board (2014) guidance on risk culture. The
model’s assumption that the bank manages risk optimally at the overall bank level,
stems from the concept of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), in which a financial
corporation is indifferent between changing its risk and changing its capital at the
margin (Nocco and Stulz, 2006). Effective implementation of ERM also requires
identification of a basket of risks to which an entity is exposed.
Screening
The use of remuneration in this paper as an exclusive contract to screen
for risk, relates to the work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on the insurance
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market, whereby information on an individual’s risk or his accident probability
can be gathered from his choice of an insurance contract. Benabou and Tirole
(2016) combine screening with multitasking, to show the impact of labour market
competition on incentives for employees. I use contracts to screen for different skill
levels of workers. My model contrasts Foster and Young (2010), who posit that
portfolio managers can always game the system, and no compensation mechanism
can screen out unskilled managers and deter performance mimicry. While their
model differentiates between manager type on the basis of their skill to deliver
returns in excess to a benchmark portfolio, my model differentiates between banker
types on the basis of project risk.
Regulatory Economics
I borrow the techniques of incentive design used in this literature, which in-
vestigates the regulation of public utilities or natural monopolies under asymmetric
information. Seminal papers by Loeb and Magat (1979) and Baron and Myerson
(1982) present an optimal regulatory contract for a monopolist, who has more in-
formation about cost conditions than the regulator. Lewis and Sappington (1988)
analyze firms with superior demand information than the regulator. Laffont and
Tirole (1986) examine regulation in the case of hidden action, by using a model
in which the regulator can observe unit costs, but cannot differentiate whether a
low cost realization is due to industry conditions, or due to firms expending cost
reducing effort. While these authors focus on some external benevolent regulatory
body that wants to maximize a weighted sum of producer and consumer surplus,
I analyze banks which regulate their bankers internally and only care about their
own profit maximization. Transfers and subsidies form the main tools for screening
in regulatory economics, whereas remuneration acts as the screening contract in my
model.
Incentives and Risk
This paper makes a case for performance based incentives in extracting pri-
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vate information on risk. While right incentives may be no panacea for excessive
risk taking, they could end up being more effective than disclosure regulations and
capital requirements (Rajan, 2006). Also, flawed incentives during the credit-market
crisis encouraged traders to take risks that were not recognized by the system, to
generate income which was nothing but market risk premium, although it appeared
as if stemming out of superior trader ability (Kashyap, 2010). In their review of the
literature on corporate governance of banks, de Haan and Vlahu (2013) draw atten-
tion to how compensation based on short-term performance might propel managers
to pursue riskier investment strategies. In my paper, however, the bank makes the
decision on which asset class to invest in, not the banker.
4.2 The Model
A risk neutral bank employs a risk neutral banker to manage asset classes on its
behalf. Two types of asset classes exist: High risk type H and Low risk type L. In
other words, we can imagine two types of bankers: H and L depending on the asset
class that they manage.3 In different states of the world, each asset type generates
state contingent returns y with different probabilities. I use the variance of these
returns as a measure of risk. The model initially starts with three discrete state
contingent values for the returns, and then progresses to a continuum of returns.
Only the banker observes the true type of the asset class, and the bank does not have
perfect information about the asset type. The bank requires the banker to report
the type (riskiness) of the asset class before receiving any remuneration. Prior to
receiving any risk report from the banker, the bank believes with probability q > 0
that the asset is actually H type and with probability (1 − q) that the asset is L
type.
The bank allocates XH amount of resources to the banker to invest if he
declares the H type asset class, and permits the banker to invest XL if he reports
3Asset class type or project type implies the risk of a banker type: High or Low
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the L type. Resources allocated for investment act as a mechanism to ensure that
the bank stays within a pre-determined level of risk. In the model, XH < XL is
an exogenous condition, either set by some regulation, for example a Value at Risk
(VaR) limit, or by a shadow cost consideration that assets might need to be sold off
in the bad state, to meet financial distress costs and this loss is higher for a risky
asset. The model assumes that the bank is risk neutral, to capture a framework
where the bank is already at an optimal overall level of risk, hence, not averse to
individual risky investments. Since the bank governs the amount of resources to
invest in an asset class, risk neutrality of the banker is plausible.
The banker receives a remuneration wH(y) or wL(y), depending on if he
reports the H type or L type project, respectively. This bilateral contract extracts
the banker’s private information about risk in a one-period setting. The model
implicitly assumes that state contingent contracts can be written ex-ante, because
of observable asset return y. The bank has the bargaining power throughout, and
the contract is a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the banker. I normalize the outside option
of the banker to 0. The model begins with a fully general remuneration scheme, and
then derives the precise structure of the scheme, comprising of either a fixed wage
or a bonus or both. The bank under asymmetric information acts as a Stackelberg
Leader: moving first and anticipating the banker’s subsequent move, and optimizing
accordingly.
The banker incurs a personal cost c > 0 if he reports the more risky H
type asset class. This can be justified in terms of the banker’s future reputation
and career prospects. Reporting a more risky project can negatively impact the
bank’s perception of the banker’s ability to identify low risk, high reward investment
opportunities. For example, if the banker reports a High risk project now and
generates high returns in the future, the bank has reason to attribute these high
future returns to a risky project paying off rather than to the banker’s ability, which
might not be the case. (Note that I am abstracting from effort and moral hazard
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here.) An alternative way to intuitively think about the cost is that reporting a
High risk project might impact the banker’s ability to attract new money. Foster
and Young (2010) discuss how investors prefer returns that are steady even though
they are not spectacular. Thus, portfolio managers wanting to stay in business
for a long period of time, can attract new money by generating a steady stream
of returns. Hence, reporting a less risky (more steady) project can appear more
lucrative. Another possible explanation relates to how managers aiming at empire-
building may prefer a bigger size of funds, and the High risk type has lesser allocated
resources compared to the Low risk type.
After an analysis of this pure adverse selection problem, the model introduces
moral hazard where the banker can exert effort to shift the distribution of returns.
In this case, the banker incurs a further cost ψ > 0 for exerting effort. Figure 4.1




















The bank’s task is to maximize its expected profits subject to getting the banker to
truthfully reveal the risk type of the project. I solve the constrained optimization for




There are three states of nature (0, 1, 2). The respective state contingent returns
are (1 + V − K, 1 + V, 1 + V + K) where K > 0. Thus, state 0 generates a low
return, state 1 a moderate return and state 2 a high return. Table 4.1 depicts the
respective state probabilities for the H and L type assets.
Table 4.1: Return Probabilities
State 0 1 2
Returns 1 + V −K 1 + V 1 + V +K
H type pH 1− 2pH pH
L type pL 1− 2pL pL
Here, 0 < pH < 1, 0 < pL < 1 and pH > pL. Thus, the expected return for
both H and L asset type is (1+V ) and NPV is V . The variance of the H type asset
is 2pHK
2 and the L type variance is 2pLK
2. Since, pH > pL, the H type asset class
has a higher variance and is more risky than the L type. The probabilities pH and
pL therefore act as the risk parameter and capture the riskiness of the project. Using
a single parameter is a plausible assumption because the banker can approximately
measure risk by calculating a value, in a static environment.
Once the banker observes the asset type, he reports it to the bank, which
is equivalent to reporting either pL or pH . If the banker reports asset type H,




H) for state payoffs
(1 + V −K, 1 + V, 1 + V + K) respectively. Similarly, he receives (w0L, w1L, w2L) for
reporting the L type asset.
The expected profit of the bank is:
pi = q[(1 + V )− pHw0H − (1− 2pH)w1H − pHw2H ] (4.1)
+(1− q)[(1 + V )− pLw0L − (1− 2pL)w1L − pLw2L]
The bank’s aim is to maximize this expected profit (or minimize expected wages),
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subject to making the banker accept employment with the bank, and also truthfully
reveal the risk of the project. This leads to the following constraints that the bank
faces in its profit maximization problem:
• Participation constraints which require the banker’s utility from working




H + (1− 2pH)w1H + pHw2H − c ≥ 0 (4.2)
= µH − c ≥ 0
where expected wage of the H type is E(wH) = µH = pHw
0







L + (1− 2pL)w1L + pLw2L ≥ 0 (4.3)
= µL ≥ 0
where expected wage of the L type is E(wL) = µL = pLw
0
L+(1−2pL)w1L+pLw2L
• Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints which ensure that the banker





H + (1− 2pH)w1H + pHw2H − c (4.4)
≥ pHw0L + (1− 2pH)w1L + pHw2L





L + (1− 2pL)w1L + pLw2L ≥ (4.5)
pLw
0
H + (1− 2pL)w1H + pLw2H − c
⇒ UL = µL ≥ pLw0H + (1− 2pL)w1H + pLw2H − c
Any contract that satisfies all of the above constraints is feasible. I first demonstrate
the benchmark case where the bank has full information about the asset type, and
then move on to the asymmetric information case where the bank is less informed
than the banker.
Benchmark case: Full Information
Here, the bank has complete information about the project type. Thus, the IC con-
straints become redundant since any truth telling incentives are no longer necessary.
The bank maximizes its profits subject to only the banker participation constraints.
Lemma 1 The banker receives no information rent in the full-information case with
discrete returns.
Proof. The optimal wage profile is determined by minimizing costs i.e. setting the
banker participation constraints (2) and (3) to binding:
µH − c = 0
µL = 0
Therefore, the optimal remuneration contract for a L type project is where ex-
pected wages are equal to the banker’s utility from the outside option. For the
H type project, the banker receives expected wages equal to the personal cost of
reporting a High risk project. Thus, the banker receives no information rent, and
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H) = (c, c, c).
Incomplete Information
In this case, the bank’s profit maximization exercise is also subject to the IC con-
straints. The model first attempts to guess a feasible wage profile, then checks if it
can achieve a separation of types, and finally investigates if it leaves any information
rent for the bankers.










H) = (c, c, c) is
a bunching contract that leads to a pooling of banker types.
Proof. This wage profile implies that UL = pLw
0
L + (1 − 2pL)w1L + pLw2L = 0.
Thus, the L type participation constraint (3) is satisfied with equality. The H type
participation constraint (2) is also satisfied with equality as UH = pHw
0





H − c = 0.
The wage profile also satisfies the H type IC constraint (4) with equality.
If the banker observes the H type project, and reports it truthfully he gets UH =
pHw
0
H + (1 − 2pH)w1H + pHw2H − c = 0. If the banker is not truthful, he gets
pHw
0
L + (1 − 2pH)w1L + pHw2L = 0. Thus, the banker is indifferent between telling
the truth and lying in the H type case. If he observes the L type project, and
reports it truthfully he gets UL = pLw
0
L + (1 − 2pL)w1L + pLw2L = 0. If the banker
is not truthful, he gets pLw
0
H + (1− 2pL)w1H + pLw2H − c = 0. Thus, the L type IC
constraint (5) is also satisfied with equality.
Thus, a flat wage contract for both types, though feasible, cannot achieve a
positive separation of types because IC constraints are satisfied trivially.














is feasible, separates banker types and leaves no information rent.
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Proof. As shown in Lemma 2, this wage profile satisfies the L type participation
constraint (3) with equality. The H type participation constraint (2) is also satisfied
with equality as UH = pHw
0
H + (1− 2pH)w1H + pHw2H − c = 0.
The wage profile also satisfies the H type IC constraint (4) with equality.
If the banker observes the H type project, and reports it truthfully he gets UH =
pHw
0
H + (1 − 2pH)w1H + pHw2H − c = 0. If the banker is not truthful, he gets
pHw
0
L + (1 − 2pH)w1L + pHw2L = 0. Thus, the banker is indifferent between telling
the truth and lying in the H type case. If he observes the L type project, and
reports it truthfully he get UL = pLw
0
L + (1 − 2pL)w1L + pLw2L = 0. If the banker
is not truthful, he gets pLw
0






pH > pL. Thus, the banker is strictly better off telling the truth in the L type case,
and the L type IC constraint (5) is satisfied with strict inequality.






H type banker would also prefer his own project type and will have no incentive to
not report truthfully. Thus, we can have a separation of banker types with a flat
wage structure, equal to the outside option for the banker when he has an L type
project, but we need wages to grow weakly in the state of nature when the banker
has an H type project. Therefore, for positive separation, we need to have a bonus
structure for the H type, albeit arbitrarily small. This wage profile is feasible and
leaves a negligible amount of information rent  for the H type banker.
4.3.2 Continuum of Returns
I consider a continuum of states of nature, which generate returns characterized by
the random variable Y with a support [0,M ]. This implies that all investments
generate positive returns, and the maximum return that can be generated is M .
The probability density function (p.d.f.) associated with the asset types H and L
is fH(y) ≥ 0 and fL(y) ≥ 0 respectively. Similarly, the cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) is FH(y) and FL(y).
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The model assumes that the return distribution of the H type asset is a mean-
preserving spread of the L type asset. This implies that the p.d.f. of the H type
asset is formed by shifting some probability away from the centre of the L type p.d.f.
onto the tails, while simultaneously preserving the mean. Analogous to the discrete
case, this means that both the assets have the same expected return, but variance
of asset type H is higher than L type. Thus, the H type asset is more risky than
the L type. The concept of stochastic ordering or dominance is used to characterize
the distribution of the asset types. Given two assets with their return distributions,
if one distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the other, then we can establish
a Rothschild-Stiglitz stochastic dominance (RSD) (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
In this case, the L type distribution dominates the H type distribution in the RSD














In terms of distribution functions, this implies that the graph of the H type
c.d.f. crosses the L type c.d.f. exactly once, where the crossing point is the identical
expected value point R. The H type c.d.f. lies on or above (below) the L type
c.d.f. to the left (right) of the crossing point.4 Thus, for the range [R,M ] we have
FH(y) < FL(y). Figure 4.2 below provides a graphical depiction.
4Intuitively, no risk averse investor would prefer asset type H over L. There also exists a similar,
but not identical, ordering called Second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), which applies to the
class of non-satiable and risk averse investors.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of returns: H type is a mean preserving spread of L type
After observing the asset type, the banker reports the return distribution to
the bank, i.e. he reports either fL(y) and FL(y) or fH(y) and FH(y). If the banker
reports asset type L, he receives a remuneration contract wL(y), and for type H
he receives wH(y). Wages are stochastic and are a function of the realized returns.
























wH(y)fH(y)dy − c ≥ 0 (4.7)
= µH − c ≥ 0









wL(y)fL(y)dy ≥ 0 (4.8)
= µL ≥ 0
























wH(y)fL(y)dy − c (4.10)




Benchmark case: Full Information
Analogous to the solution of the discrete case, the bank has complete information
about the project type and maximizes its profits subject to the banker participation
constraints.
Lemma 3 Under full information with a continuum of returns, a menu of wages
that pays no information rent to the banker is optimal.
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Proof. The optimal wage profile can be determined by minimizing costs i.e. setting
the banker participation constraints (7) and (8) to binding:
µH − c = 0
µL = 0
Thus, no information rent is left behind for the banker and any menu of wage
contracts, wL(y) and wH(y), that can sustain the expected wage profile (µH , µL) =
(c, 0) is optimal. For example, contracts of the type wL(y) = 0 and wH(y) = c.
Incomplete Information
Similar to the discrete case, the model now takes into account the IC constraints,
and guesses a feasible wage profile that can separate banker types without leaving
any information rent.
Proposition 2 A flat wage profile for the L type banker and a bonus contract for
the H type, separates banker types and leaves no information rent for the banker,
given a continuum of returns.
• wL(y) = 0
• wH(y) =

0 if 0 ≤ y < R
βH =
c
1−FH(R) if R ≤ y ≤M
Proof. This implies that UL =
M∫
0
wL(y)fL(y)dy = 0. Thus, L type participation
constraint (8) is satisfied with equality. The H type participation constraint (7) is
also satisfied with equality as UH =
M∫
0
wH(y)fH(y)dy − c = 0.
The wage profile satisfies the H type IC constraint (9) with equality. If the
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1− FH(R)fH(y)dy − c
=
c
1− FH(R) [FH(M)− FH(R)]− c
=
c
1− FH(R) [1− FH(R)]− c
= 0
If the banker is not truthful he gets
M∫
0
wL(y)fH(y)dy = 0. Thus, the banker is
indifferent between telling the truth and lying in the H type case. If he observes
the L type project and reports it truthfully, he gets UL =
M∫
0
wL(y)fL(y)dy = 0. If











1− FH(R)fL(y)dy − c
=
c
1− FH(R) [FL(M)− FL(R)]− c
=
c











< 0(since FH(R) < FL(R))
Thus, the banker is strictly better off telling the truth in the L type case,
and the L type IC constraint (10) is satisfied with strict inequality.
By giving the H type banker, some tiny  more than βH , the H type banker
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would also prefer his own project type and will have no incentive to not report
truthfully. Thus, for the continuous space of returns, positive separation happens
when the banker receives a bonus for the H type project, and a flat wage equal to
the outside option for the L type project. This wage profile is feasible and leaves a
negligible amount of information rent for the H type banker. Figure 4.3 provides
a graphical depiction of this wage profile relating it to the c.d.f. of the two banker
types.
Figure 4.3: Wage profile of the two banker types
4.4 Effort and Moral Hazard
If a banker exerts effort e > 0, the support of the return space y shifts from [0,M ]
to [e,N ] where N = M + e. The banker can now generate returns y with
• p.d.f feff (y) =

f(y − e) if y ≥ e
0 if y ∈ [0, e)
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• c.d.f. F eff (y) =

F (y − e) if y > e
0 if y ∈ [0, e]
This is a valid pdf as feff (y) ≥ 0 and
∞∫
0
feff (y)dy = 1. The identical expected
return of the two projects shifts from R to R + e, and variance is characterized by
Rothschild-Stiglitz stochastic dominance, i.e. the H type asset is a mean preserving
spread of the L type asset. Therefore, for the range [R + e,N ], we have F effH (y) <
F effL (y). Figure 4.4 plots the graph of the distribution.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of returns with effort: H type is a mean preserving spread
of L type
Effort has a positive cost for the banker given by ψ > 0. The bank cannot
observe effort, and to exert effort or not is an action under the sole control of the
banker.5 The model assumes that the bank always wants to induce a positive level
of effort from the banker, and solves a mixed problem of adverse selection followed
by moral hazard. The remuneration contract of the banker is wL(y), wH(y). The
















5Punishments below zero are not permitted. Hence, if a return between 0 and e is observed, the
bank knows no effort was exerted, but cannot punish the banker.
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• Participation constraints (PC):




H (y)dy − c− ψ ≥ 0 (4.12)




L (y)dy − ψ ≥ 0 (4.13)































The right hand side of these truth-telling constraints implies that the banker
can choose to exert effort or not while lying. The bank is then constrained
to pay the banker atleast the maximum of these two terms on the right hand
side, to get him to reveal the truth.
• Moral Hazard Incentive Compatibility (MHIC) constraints which en-























4.4.1 Benchmark case: Full Information
The bank has complete information about the project type and banker’s effort. The
bank maximizes its profits by setting the participation constraints of the banker to
binding.
Lemma 4 The optimal contract under full information in a model with effort, can
be a menu of contracts that, in expectation, pay the H type banker a sum equal to
his outside option, cost of reporting and cost of effort, and the L type banker a sum
equal to his outside option and cost of effort.









L (y)dy = ψ
Thus, no information rent is left behind for the banker.
4.4.2 Incomplete Information
Analogous to the previous solutions, I begin by guessing a feasible wage profile that
can separate banker types, and which takes a piecewise structure as shown below.
• wL(y) =

0 if 0 ≤ y < αL
βL if αL ≤ y ≤ N
• wH(y) =

0 if 0 ≤ y < αH
βH if αH ≤ y ≤ N
To find out the values of αL, βL, αH , βH , I simplify the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints (12) to (17) by substituting in these equations
the above step function for wages, as follows:
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1− F effH (αH)
]




1− F effL (αL)
]
≥ ψ (13’)




1− F effH (αH)
]




1− F effH (αL)
]






1− F effL (αL)
]




1− F effL (αH)
]
− c− ψ, βH [1− FL(αH)]− c
]
(15’)




1− F effH (αH)
]




1− F effL (αL)
]
− ψ ≥ βL [1− FL(αL)] (17’)
Lemma 5 A binding L type participation constraint implies that the H type par-
ticipation constraint cannot bind.
Proof. Let us assume that both the H type PC (12’) and L type PC (13’) are
binding. Thus, βH =
c+ψ[
1−F effH (αH)
] and βL = ψ[
1−F effL (αL)




FL(αL)− F effL (αL)
]
− ψ ≥ 0
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=⇒ ψ[
1− F effL (αL)
] [FL(αL)− F effL (αL)] ≥ ψ











] . Substituting this value in H type ASIC (14’) we have:
βH
[
1− F effH (αH)
]




1− F effH (αL)
]




1− F effH (αH)
]
− c− ψ ≥
max
 ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ, ψ[





] [1− FH(M)] = 0 as FH(M) = 1.[
ψ[
1−F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ
]
> 0 as F effL (M) > F
eff
H (M) (from RSD) and
ψ > 0. Therefore,
max
 ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ, ψ[





1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ
Therefore, (14’) simplifies to
βH
[
1− F effH (αH)
]
− c− ψ ≥ ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ
=⇒ βH
[
1− F effH (αH)
]
− c− ψ > 0
This implies that βH >
c+ψ[
1−F effH (αH)
] , which contradicts the assumption about bind-
ing H type PC (12’). Thus, if the L type PC (13’) binds, H type PC (12’) cannot
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be binding, and some rent needs to be left behind for the H type.
Proposition 3 The wage profile:
• wL(y) =





] if M ≤ y ≤ N
• wH(y) =







] if M ≤ y ≤ N
is feasible and separates banker types, but leaves behind an information rent for the
H type banker.
Proof. We have established in Lemma 5 that if the L type PC (13’) is binding, then
the H type PC (12’) cannot be binding, thus the following wage profile for the L
type satisfies a binding PC (13’):
wL(y) =





] if M ≤ y ≤ N
Also, if the H type ASIC (14’) is satisfied, it implies that the H type PC (12’) is
automatically satisfied with strict inequality, i.e. if
βH
[
1− F effH (αH)
]
− c− ψ ≥ ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ
then βH
[
1− F effH (αH)
]
− c − ψ > 0. Thus, the H type PC (12’) is irrelevant for





1− F effH (αH)
]
− c− ψ ≥ ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [1− F effH (M)]− ψ
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=⇒ βH ≥ ψ[
1− F effL (M)
] [
1− F effH (αH)
] [1− F effH (M)]+ c[
1− F effH (αH)
]
=⇒ βH ≥ kψ + c[
















1− F effL (αL)
]




1− F effL (αH)
]
− c− ψ, βH [1− FL(αH)]− c
]




1− F effL (αH)
]
− c− ψ, βH [1− FL(αH)]− c
]
We guess αH = M , as a solution. Therefore, the constraints simplify to:
βH ≥ kψ + c[
1− F effH (M)
]
βH ≥ ψ[










We see that if βH ≥ kψ+c[
1−F effH (M)
] is satisfied, then βH ≥ ψ[
1−F effH (M)
] is automatically
satisfied. Thus, βH ≥ ψ[
1−F effH (M)













For this βH to satisfy βH ≥ kψ+c[
1−F effH (M)
] , we will need to make additional assump-
tions about c, ψ and the distribution of returns.
Instead, if βH ≥ kψ+c[
1−F effH (M)














with strict inequality. Thus,
there exists the following feasible wage profile for the H type, which separates banker
type but leaves behind an information rent.
wH(y) =







] if M ≤ y ≤ N
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a theoretical framework on how banks can use banker remuner-
ation, to extract information about asset class risk from its better informed bankers.
I find that a bonus contract, in which wages are paid only when a return higher than
the expected value is realized, acts as a truth-telling incentive for bankers with a
high risk asset class. The low risk banker does not have an incentive to mimic the
high risk banker, because of reputational costs associated with reporting a risky
project. Under pure adverse selection, the banker is able to achieve positive sepa-
ration without leaving any information rent for either banker type. In a scenario
where the bank faces an additional information constraint related to banker effort
to shift the distribution of returns, the bank cannot achieve the first-best contract,
and some information rent needs to be given to the high risk banker.
The model makes a case for the usefulness of bonuses as a screening device for
asset class risk. Intuitively, a low risk banker is content with a flat wage throughout,
whereas a high risk banker will demand a fraction of the higher returns his asset
class generates, i.e., a reward for the high risk he takes. This choice of remuneration
reveals to the bank the risk associated with respective asset classes. Truthful risk
reports help the bank to allocate assets across the balance sheet, and are crucial
for good risk management which is imperative from a social perspective, since bank
failures can have systemic effects.
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